Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India - An Analytical Study with Special Reference to Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 by Ansari, Abdul Tawwab
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS IN INDIA 
•An Analytical Study with Special Reference to 
Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 
DISSERTATION 
M^ittv of Hatoi 
ft&f 
BY 
ABDUL TAWWAB ANSARI 
Under the Supervision of 
PROF. S. S. HASNAT AZMI 
Dean and Chairman 
D E P A R T M E N T O F LAW 
A L I G A R H M U S L I M U N I V E R S I T Y 
A L I G A R H ( I N D I A \ 
1995 
DS2990 
Prof. S.S. Hasnat Azmi 
DEAN & CHAIRMAN 
Phones 
External:400457 
Int^ ernal: 271 
FACULTY OF LAW 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERISTY 
ALIGARH - 202002 
Ref. No. Dated 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
This is to certify that Mr,Abdul Tawwab Ansari has 
completed his dissertation entitled "Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards in India - An analytical study 
with special reference, to arbitration and conciliation 
ordinance, 1996" in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Laws. 
He has conducted his study under my supervision. 
(Prof asnat Azmi) 
TO 
MY 
LOVING PARENTS 
MRS. AND MR. ABDUL AZIZ ANSARI 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
Glory to Allah and his blessing on the Prophet and his 
pious and cleansed progeny. 
My pleasant duty has made me to express my sense of 
gratitude to all those who have directly or indirectly 
contributed in my evolution to the status of a writer of 
this dissertation. The list comprises a long list of my 
friends, class-mates, relatives and well-wishers. 
Over and above I must express my deep sense of 
gratitude to my revered supervisor Prof. S.S.H. Azmi, Dean 
and chairman, Faculty of Law, for his sincere advice, proper 
supervision and sympathetic attitude in completion of this 
work. Without his help, it would not have been possible on 
my part to complete it. 
I am very fortun^to have the guidance of my learned 
teacher, renowned Prof. V.S. Rekhi, who has read and 
commented on almost every aspect of the topic. I always 
valued his sustained critical comments^ 
I am most sincerely and deeply 
indebted to him. 
I owe a special sense of academic indebted to my 
learned teacher Dr. M. Mushir Alam, Reader, who helped me 
extensively in completion of this dissertation and provided 
me an academic patronage. 
On the same line I express my gratefulness to my 
learned teacher, Mr. Ishaque Qureshi, Reader, whose valuable 
suggestion enhanced the tone of this work. 
I shall be failing my duty if I do not express my 
respect and gratefulness to my scholarly teacher Prof. M.Z. 
Siddiqui for his ever encouragement and guidance in 
pursuance of academic endevour. 
I feel duty bound to express my deep feeling of 
gratitude to my respected teachers Prof. Qaiser Hayat, Prof. 
Saleem Akhtar and Dr. Nazir H. Khan whose social amd amiable 
nature and cooperation have always been greatly appreciated 
by the members of the faculty. 
I must not fail to express my respect and gratitude to 
my learned teachers Mr. Faizan Mustafa and Mr. Shakeel 
Samdani, Lecturers, who imbued keen academic interest in me. 
Their sincer advice, encouragement and brotherly attitude 
have always been a source of inspiration since I joined this 
faculty. 
My grateful acknowledgment is due, to respective 
teachers Mr. Zaheeruddin, Mr. Javed Talib and Mr. Moin 
Farooqui, Research Scholar, who encouraged me a lot in 
furtherance of academic pursuit. 
The dream of my completion of LLM degree course would 
not have been a reality for love, affection and blessings of 
Ammi and Abbu. I can not help expressing myself as to how 
deeply I value their precious assistance. To them the 
dissertation is dedicated. 
A special mention goes to my father-in-law Mr. 
Shamsuzzoha Ansari who not only inculcated a deep sense of 
higher academic pursuit in me but also encouraged a lot in 
accelerating the same. Many grateful thanks are due to him. 
I most sincerely and warmly express my gratefulness to 
my elder brother Mr. Abdul Wohab Ansari and sisters, Mrs. 
Roqaiya and Kulsum, who have kindled and channeled my 
interest in higher studies. Many thanks are due to my 
younger brother, Abdul Mabood whom I always found stood 
beside me to render such services as he could. 
I have really been fortunate to have enjoyed the 
company of my es esprit de corps class-mates, more 
particularly Messrs, Khalid Shamim, Athar, Nafees, Chaudhary 
Ishrat, Mumtaz, Harish, Mohd. Ahmad, Shafi, Ghulam Ghaus, 
Tarique, Yahia Ansari, Salim, Yaqub, Mohd. Yar Arshadi, Miss 
Shazia Usmani and Miss Anu whose fraternisation helped me a 
lot at the moment of distress and exhaustion. 
I wish to take this opportunity to extend my sincere 
thank to my esteemed friends, Messrs. Abdul Mob in, Irfan 
Ahmad, Zillur-Rahman, Salahuddin, Chaudhary Jaseem, Mahfooz, 
Farrukh, Mashhood, Shahid Zafar, Chaudhary Alim, Rizwan 
Ahmad, Ghulam Waris, Azhar Asif and Akbal Ahmad and Miss 
Ruby Yadav whose encouragement and help are genuinely 
heartfelt. 
I also express my sense of gratitude to my home town 
friends, Mohd. Naiem, M. Ishaque, A. Mustafa, Hedayatullah, 
M. Aslam and Rafi Ahmad for their being ever ready to render 
me such assistance as they could. 
More importantly I express my grateful thanks to the 
Law Seminar staff, specially, Messrs. Wazid Hussain, Roshan 
Khyal, Zulfiqar and Tarique for giving me all the needed 
help in completion of this work. 
I am also thankful to Mr. Amant ullah. Computer 
Programmer, DRDA, who performed the tedious task of taking 
out computer print and lick the dissertation into shape. 
Lastly, I must thanks my wife Atiya Benazir, who has 
provided the warm emotional support and has voluntarily 
accepted many deprivation in order to allow me to complete 
my LLM degree course uninterruptedly. 
Requesting success and.guidance from Allah 
Abdul Tawwab Ansari 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Certificate 
Acknowledgment 
Indroduction 1-20 
Chapter - I Historical Perspective 2S-43 
(A) Position in India prior to 1937 82 
<B) Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 31 
after the Act of 1937 
Chapter - II Meaning Effect and Filing of 45-73 
Foreign Award 
(A) Foreign Award ? 47 
(B) Effect of Foreign Award 56 
(C) Filing of Foreign Award 61 
Chapter - III Enforcement of Foreign Awards 75-1S4 
in India 
(A) Enforcement of Foreign Awards Under the 77 
Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) 
Act 1937 
(1) Conditions for Enforcement of Foreign 78 
Awards under the Act of 1937 
(E) Challenge of Award 90 
(B) Enforcement of Foreign Award under the 92 
Act of 1961 
Chapter - IV Stay of Concurrent Proceedings 1S6-155 
(A) Disretionary Power 128 
(B) Mandatory Power 138 
(C) Distinction Between the Act of 1940, 1937 144 
and 1961 
Chapter - V Arbitration and Conciliation 157-191 
Ordinance,1996 - An Evaluation 
<A) Enforcement of Foreign Awards in India 166 
(B) Enforcement^Geneva Convention Awards 168 
A 
(C) Enforcement of New York Convention Awards 176 
Chapter - VI Conclusion and Suggestions 192-201 
Table of Cases 202 
Bibliography 20^ 
Introduction 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the purpose of this dissertation to briefly 
analyse the problems, faced in the field of enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in India and examine the present 
position with special regard to the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Ordinance 1996 . The Ordinance has not only 
repealed the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 but also repealed 
the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 and the 
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961, 
governing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
India. The present dissertation keeping in view the 
drawbacks of the said enactments endeavors evaluation of 
the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 in respect 
of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India. 
Before stepping into the legal framework of the issue, 
it would be in the fitness of the subject under review to 
take an account of the general problems concerning the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India. This is 
with a view to formulate the problems clearly and 
categorically, and to recognise the issues, involved in the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award in India. 
"Trade disputes can spawn resentments and animosities 
* A Bill to the same effect has unanimously been passed by 
the parliament on 22nd July 1996. See The Hindustan Tiaies, 
New Delhi, July 23, 1996. 
which prejudice social and political relationship among the 
peoples of the world. They must be prevented or nipped in 
bud or in any case amicably settled," 2ays Spruille 
Braden . Referring to arbitration's "impressive record of 
achievement", Braden points out that "friendly business 
relation are more likely to be resumed in wake of disputes 
settled by arbitration than after law court litigation that 
usually lasts longer and costs more " 
In event of dispute over contractual matters, the 
expenses and delay may be great. Dispute resolutions by 
court is often ten times as expensive as arbitration and is 
considerably longer and more inconvenient. Arbitration is 
the voluntary submission of disputes by the parties to a 
person or body of persons, qualified to judge them, with an 
agreement that the arbitrators' decision will be final and 
binding on the parties. The decision of the arbitrator is 
called the 'award'. In many cases the award is carried out 
faithfully by the parties but in case of recalcitrance it is 
necessary to ascertain the means by which the award (zan be 
enforced in law. 
The purpose of arbitration is to arrive at a binding 
decision on the dispute between the parties. It is an 
implied term of every arbitration agreement that the parties 
will carry out the award into effect. However, when the 
losing party fails to carry out the award, the winning party 
will need to take steps to enforce performance of it. 
Effectively, only two steps may be taken. The first, is to 
exert some form of pressure, commercial or otherwise in 
order to show the losing party that it is in its interest to 
perform the award. The second is to invoke the power of the 
state, exercised through its courts, to seize the losing 
party's assets in satisfaction of the award. The most 
powerful pressure involves the business interest of the 
losing party and financial losses. Some trade associations 
guarantee the execution of award, passed against its members 
through a security. The property belonging to its members 
will come to vest in the hand of the winner in case the 
award is not carried out. Respect for opinion of 
arbitrators and fear of being criticised by one's own 
business community also amounts to a persuasive reason for 
the performance of the award. Sometimes the losing party 
apprehends that non-performance of the awards will create an 
impression in the eyes of the business community that one's 
business is in critical financial situation and will avoid 
doing further business with the defaulter. Non performance 
may also produce adverse effect on trade relations with 
other parties resulting into financial losses. However, if 
the commercial reasons fails the winning party may have to 
adopt some coercive measures to enforce an award against a 
defaulting party. 
An arbitral tribunal, unlike a court of law, has 
neither coercive power to enforce its award nor has a role 
to play in its enforcement. Once an award is rendered by 
it, the tribunal has nothing more to do with its 
enforcement. Neither an arbitral tribunal nor any arbitral 
institution, under whose auspices, it may be operating, is 
directly concerned with "recognition and enforcement" of its 
award. 
Recognition of a foreign award arises when a court is 
asked to grant a remedy in respect of a dispute which has 
been the subject of previous arbitral proceedings. The 
party in whose favour the award is made will object that the 
dispute has already been settled. To prove this the party 
will seek to produce the award to the court and ask the 
court to recognise it as valid and binding upon the parties 
in respect of the issue with which it dealt. If an award 
disposes of all the issues raised in the new court 
proceedings, it will be recognised for the purpose of 
issuing res-judicata to put an end to these new proceeding. 
If an award disposes of some of the issues raised in the new 
proceedings, it will need to be recognised for the purpose 
of issuing estoppel, so as to prevent the issue with which 
the award dealt from being raised again. 
Recognition of an award is a defensive process, which 
may be illustrated with the help of example of a company 
which is sued by a foreign supplier for goods sold and 
delivered, but allegedly not paid for. Suppose that the 
dispute between the Company and the foreign supplier has 
already been submitted to arbitration and that an award has 
been made, in which the foreign supplier's claim was 
dismissed. In these circumstances, the Company would ask 
the court to 'recognise' the award as a valid defence to the 
foreign supplier's claim. If the court is prepared to 
accept the defense, the claim for payment will be dismissed. 
The legal force and effect of the foreign award would have 
been recognised, but the award itself would not have been 
enforced. 
Unlike the recognition of an award, when a court is 
asked to enforce an award, it is asked not merely to 
recognise the legal force and effect of the award but also 
to ensure that it carried out by using such legal sanctions 
as are available with the court. Enforcement goes a step 
further than recognition. A court which is prepared to 
grant enforcement of an award will do so because it 
recognises the award as validly made and binding upon the 
parties to it and therefor, suitable for enforcement. In 
this context the term recognition and enforcement do run 
together. At this stage one can not be delinked from each 
other. 
Recognition and enforcement are concerned upon having 
the award carried out into effect. The terms ars sometimes 
b 
used as if they are always inextricably linked. This is 
because an award may be recognised, without being enforced 
but if it enforced, then it is necessarily recognised first 
by the court which ordered its enforcement. An award can 
not be enforced without being recognised by the court. That 
is why the New York convention deals with the "recognition 
and enforcement" of foreign arbitral award in extricable 
manner. 
The recognition and enforcement can certainly not be 
admitted without efficient safeguard. Different reasons 
have been advanced about the view that apart from any 
implication of territorial sovereignty, an award made in one 
e 
country should become operative in another . Although, 
there are differences of opinion as to the theory which may 
adequately explain the basis of recognition and enforcement 
of a foreign award but the oldest and most acceptable is 
the theory of 'reciprocity'. The role of 'reciprocity' in 
the enforcement of foreign awards got impetus after coming 
up of a large number of regional and international 
Conventions on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. Dependency of international arbitral 
process upon the national legal system is more clear in the 
context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
awards. A state will be reluctant to confer upon private 
arbitral tribunal, the draconian power, it is prepared to 
confer upon the judges of its own courts. The power to 
enforce an award against the reluctant party, by such 
summary method as the attachment of bank's accounts or the 
sequestration of assets, is a power which forms the part of 
prerogative of the state. It is not a power of a state 
likely to be delegated. In consequence, enforcement of an 
award has to take place through the court of the place of 
enforcement operating under their own rules of law. The 
detailed procedure adopted by these courts vary from country 
to country. It is the regional and international 
Conventions which has to some extent brought uniformity in 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
most of the important trading countries of the world. It is 
significant to note that one of the most important feature 
of an award in international commercial arbitration is that 
it should be readily 'transportable'. It must be capable of 
being taken from the state in which it was made, under one 
system of law, to other state in which it is able to qualify 
for recognition and enforcement, under different system of 
law. 
The method and grounds of recognition and 
enforcement to be adopted in any particular country depend 
upon the place where the award is made, (that is to say 
whether it for example made under New York Convention or 
Geneva Convention). Recognition and enforcement is likely 
to be easiest to obtain under international convention where 
a 'forum state' is bound by such convention. 
o 
It needs emphasis that a domestic court functioning 
under its national laws providing for a well elaborated 
scheme for enforcement of domestic awards, recognises 
unquestioned jurisdiction of its court to enforce domestic 
arbitral award. But they do not have inherent jurisdiction 
in the matters and issues resolved in other country. They 
do not concern with the issue involving foreign element. 
Thus, recognition and enforcement of an award rendered in 
international commercial arbitration stands on a different 
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plane . However, it is national laws which govern the 
extent and limits of measures available with the courts to 
compel the reluctant party to perform the award. No state 
allows a foreign award to be recognised and enforced by 
direct execution without the insertion of an authoritative 
act of state in which the execution is to take place. This 
is because of the fact that the question whether an award to 
be recognised, involves an examination of many thorny legal 
points, which it would be inappropriate to leave to the 
executive. The conditions which are required to be 
fulfilled for an execution are different in different 
countries. 
At common law, a foreign award may be enforced by 
bringing an action in English Courts provided that the 
arbitration and award are valid in accordance with its 
proper law. It may be enforced directly if it comes within 
the purview of (English) Arbitration Act, 1975, which gives 
•"1 
effect to the New York Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, 1958. 
An award of British Arbitration bodies may be enforced 
under the Administration of Justice Act, 1920 or the Foreign 
Judgement (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. 
Under German law, a foreign award which fulfills the 
conditions for recognition can be enforced if the 
admissibility of execution has been pronounced through an 
"Executive Judgment". An 'Executive Judgment' is a leave 
for enforcement of a Judgment delivered in foreign state. 
It is pronounced at preliminary stage without being 
determining the question as to whether the foreign court or 
tribunal has applied the law which according to its rules of 
conflicts of laws governs the case. 
French law, allows its courts before giving the 
exequatur (which corresponds to the executive judgment of 
German Court) to re-examine the case completely in order to 
make sure that both in fact and in law, the judgment is 
satisfactory. The French Court has power not only to grant 
or refuse leave but also to alter the Judgment or award by 
reducing its amount . 
In India, recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award was hitherto governed by The Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act 1937 and The Foreign Awards 
iO 
(Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. The Act of 1937, 
adopted the then prevailing scheme and practice of 
arbitration and enforcement of resultant award embodied in 
the Geneva Convention, 1927 and the Geneva Protocol, 1923. 
The Foreign Awards Act 1961, ensured recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India in 
accordance with the procedure and scheme evolved under the 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Awards, 1958. 
Under the Act of 1937, the party seeking recognition 
and enforcement of foreign award in India was required to 
establish the grounds of qualification for an award to be 
recognised and enforced which were two fold. First, it had 
to be established that the award was made pursuant to an 
arbitration agreement to which the Geneva Protocol and 
Geneva Convention applied and Secondly, it had also to be 
established that the parties were "Subject to Jurisdiction" 
of one of the contracting states to Geneva Protocol and the 
Geneva Convention. 
Under the Foreign Award Act, 1961, an award made in any 
state was to be recognised and enforced, so long as it 
satisfied the basic conditions set down in the Act of 1961 . 
The party seeking recognition and enforcement was required 
to produce to the relevant court, the award and the 
arbitration agreement under which it was made and the 
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necessary evidence proving that it was a foreign award under 
the Act, 1961. When the enforcing court satisfied that an 
award was a foreign award under the Act, it had to enforce 
it. Unless, it embraced by one of the provision of Section 
7 of the Act which had afforded several grounds on which an 
award could be refused by the enforcing court. The 
conditions for enforcement of a foreign award and the 
grounds of its refusal has been discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
However the object of these enactments was to enjoin 
parties to arbitration agreement to abide by their 
undertaking contained therein. To achieve this goal, three 
measures were adopted. Firstly, they recognised the 
validity of arbitral awards rendered by foreign arbitral 
tribunal in foreign land, provided it fulfilled certain 
conditions prescribed by these enactments. Secondly, they 
provided legal machinery for enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in India and thirdly, they discouraged resort to 
judicial proceeding intended to vitiate the efficacy of the 
arbitral process. 
On account of certain significant practical impediments 
and inherent drawbacks, the enactments hitherto regulating 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in India failed to 
achieve its proclaimed objectives. The arbitration process 
under the said enactments was fraught with many obstacles. 
We may start with the basic one, from which stem mast 
others. In order to formulate the obstacles more clearly 
and specifically it will be highly convenient to deal with 
the drawbacks of the said enactments separately. 
PROBLEMS UNDER THE ACT OF 1937 : Enforcement of foreign 
award in India under the Act of 1937 posed special 
difficulties. The statement of objects and reasons of the 
Act of 1961, itself revealed the legislative intention and 
highlighted a few prominent in-built drawbacks of the 
Protocol Act, 1937, inherited from Geneva Convention. The 
Act of 1937 placed undue emphasis on the law of the land 
where the arbitration was to take place. The Act of 1937 
also laid down much emphasis on remedies that were available 
to the parties to invoke the law of the country, wherever 
the enforcement was sought for the purpose of setting aside 
the award. 
The award given by a tribunal of a country and its 
enforcement in the same territory do not involve any 
complication. Difficulty arises only when an award is 
passed in a country other than the one where it is sought to 
be enforced. The Act of 1937 could not escape from such 
complexity. The Act imposed an obligation on the party 
seeking enforcement of a foreign award to establish the 
validity and finality of it in the country where it was 
passed as well as in a country also where its enforcement 
io 
was sought. The onus of proof on plaintiff to establish the 
finality and validity of award rendered in a different 
country was considered a great hurdle in meeting the growing 
intensity of international economic relations. In practice 
the finality of an award could be proved only by producing 
an exequatur (leave for enforcement or like) from the 
country in which it is made. The party was also required to 
obtain a leave for enforcement from a court of a country in 
which he sought the enforcement of a foreign award. This 
requirement finally led to the problem of double exequatur. 
The system of double exequatur explained a situation where 
the beneficiary of an award was not only obliged, inter 
alia, to demonstrate the finality of the award in the 
country of its origin, but also in the country in which he 
sought its enforcement, usually entailing the institution of 
a costly, time-consuming and otherwise unnecessary 
proceeding for judicial enforcement order. The underlying 
reasons for the system of double-exequatur and its 
abandonment in the post second World War era have been 
elaborated in the following chapter. 
One teething problem that emerged under the Act of 1937 
was that as to the law applicable in a situation where 
arbitration agreement was valid according to the law of one 
country but invalid under the law of another country. 
Arbitration agreement is generally rendered invalid on the 
ground usually described as violative of public policy and 
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the law of the country where the award is sought to be 
enforced. There existed no indication under the Act of 1937 
as to the law governing the validity of an agreement in the 
said situation. 
Owing to the diversity and complexity of national laws 
and the rules of the conflict of laws, it was not easy to a 
party seeking enforcement of an award, to prove the 
conformity of the procedure followed by the arbitral 
tribunal of a country where the award was made, with the 
"public policy' and "principle of law' of a country where 
award was sought to be enforced. This condition in fact 
provided an opportunity to the reluctant party to attack on 
an award on the ground that it offended the law of the 
'Forum State'. These two concepts viz. "public policy' and 
'principle of laws' have not been free from vagueness and 
subjected to varied interpretation. The nature and attitude 
of the court in respect of these two concepts have been 
discussed at length in the ensuing chapter. 
PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS UNDER THE ACT OF 
1961 : The Foreign Awards Act, 1961 suffered mainly from the 
following defects with regard to enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award in India. 
Like the Act of 1937, the Act of 1961 also did not 
facilitate the quick resolution of disputes through 
i d 
arbitration. That is why the Multinational Companies like 
Enron preferred arbitration in London under international 
regulation than to be bound to the Indian law. 
Under the Act of 1961, the supervisory role of the 
court was maximum in arbitral process. An arbitral award 
could not be enforced, unless the court of the country, 
where its enforcement was sought, made it a 'rule of court'. 
There was no provision for direct enforcement. The 
conversion of the award into a 'rule of court' was 
considered to be a great hurdle and time consuming in its 
enforcement in India. 
Arbitration clause could be rendered in operative by 
filing a suit in the municipal court by one of the parties 
to the agreement, thus, preventing the arbitrator to 
arbitrate. Such method of abuse of judicial process could 
be prevented by 'stay' of local action in respect of 
concurrent measures pursued by the parties to the foreign 
arbitral agreements, one at national level and another in 
foreign land where the arbitral tribunal was situated. To 
discourage this vexatious practice, the courts were 
empowered to grant 'stay' of local action under the 
Arbitration Act, 1940, the Arbitration (Protocol and 
Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Award (Recognition and 
Enforcement) Act, 1961. The power of the court was 
mandatory under the Act of 1937 and of 1961, while it was 
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discretionary under the Arbitration Act, 19^0. Parties to 
the foreign arbitral agreement in India frequently invoked 
the Act of 19^0 for staying a local action not to facilitate 
the arbitrator to arbitrate but to create hurdle in the 
legal proceeding for the enforcement of a foreign award in 
India. Such a practice consequently, hampered the speedy 
resolution of the dispute through arbitration and led to the 
foreign companies to form a biased opinion against 
conducting arbitration in India pursuant to the local Act of 
1940. 
Under the Act of 1961, there were five grounds on which 
recognition and enforcement of an award could be refused at 
the request of the party against whom it was sought to be 
enforced. The burden of proving the grounds of refusal 
vested in the party against whom the award was invoked. 
Like the Act of 1937, the Act of 1961 also prescribed two 
additional grounds which could be raised by the relevant 
court on its own motion. They were, the compatibility of 
the obligations imposed by the foreign award with that of 
'public policy' of India and capability of dispute to be 
settled through arbitration under the law in force in India-
There were grave uncertainties as to what constitutes 
'public policy' of India and discretion granted to the court 
for determining the arbitrabi1ity of a dispute under the law 
in force in India. 
17 
There was also uncertainty as to the content of the 
term "foreign award'. India had ratified the New York 
Convention subject to the reservation that it would apply it 
only to the contract of commercial nature. This finally 
invited another controversy as to which contracts could be 
considered to be 'commercial'. There existed no guide line 
for determination of a contract considered to be 
"Commercial' in both the Acts of 1937 and of 1961. 
The dissertation has been divided into six chapters. 
Chapter first provides a brief description of the position 
before the advent of the Law relating to enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in India and an attempt has been 
made to highlight the problems concerning enforcement of 
foreign award in India. In its historical perspective. 
Chapter second deals with the meaning and effect of the 
term 'foreign award', which not only constituted the key 
term in both the repealed Acts but also determined the 
applicability of the said Acts. Procedure of filing of a 
foreign award under the repealed enactments has also been 
taken into account in the same chapter. 
Enforcement of foreign arbitral award in India 
constitutes the subject matter of the third chapter. The 
conditions for enforcement of foreign award coupled with the 
grounds of its refusal under the repealed enactments 
regulating the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in 
India have been discussed at length and an attempt l/as been 
/ 
made to highlight the problems faced in respect of 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award in India in the light 
of the decided case. The efficacy of the Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards 
Act, 1961 is also thoroughly evaluated against the 
background of their respective legislative goals and of the 
Conventions on which they were modeled. 
The fourth chapter delves into the problem faced by 
'Stay' of the concurrent proceedings pursued by the parties 
to the foreign arbitral agreement, one at national level and 
another in foreign land where the arbitral tribunal was 
situated. Since an Arbitral clause could be rendered 
inoperative by filing a suit in the municipal court under 
the Local Act (The Arbitration Act 1940) by one of the 
parties to agreement, it was considered a great hurdle in 
speedy resolution of disputes through arbitration in Ivndia. 
On account of the said legal lacunae most of the foreign 
companies preferred arbitration outside India and avoided 
conducting an arbitration in India pursuant to the 
Arbitration Act, 1940 which empowered the court with 
discretion to stay the legal proceedings in respect of 
enforcement of foreign award in India. The veracity of 
traditional bias against conducting arbitration in India is 
tested in the light of judicial pronouncement in the same 
chapter. 
iS 
In the fifth chapter an attempt has been made to 
critically evaluate the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ordinance, 1996 with special regard to the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award in India. With the promulgation of 
Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996, the law in 
India relating to arbitration has last come of age. 
Chapter sixth is devoted to concluding remarks. An 
important conclusion of the study and a few pertinent issues 
and problems undermining the efficacy of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 are identified and appropriate 
suggestions to enhance its credibility is offered. 
Moreover, cases arising under the said two repealed 
enactments regulating enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in India have been decided by the Privy Council (before 
independence) High Courts, and the Supreme Court of India. 
The law expounded by the courts is as much part of the law 
as statutes law. These decisions, if not inconsistent with 
the provisions of the new Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ordinance, 1996, will continue ^o retain their relevance. 
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Chapter - I 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Though at the first glance international commercial 
arbitration and the allied problems appear to be a peculiar 
product of modern times, when commercial contract across the 
national boundaries registered a phenomenal rise, it would 
not be an exaggeration to assert that "Commercial 
arbitration on international (or shall we say trans 
national) level is as old as one can remember" . 
Before analysing the problems concerning enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in India under its existing 
regulatory enactments, it may be useful to provide a brief 
description of the position before the advent of the law 
relating to the enforcement of foreign awards in India. In 
this chapter an attempt has been made to highlight the 
problem concerning enforcement of foreign award in India in 
its historical perspective. 
<A) POSITION IN INDIA PRIOR TO 1937 : Before passing of the 
Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, there 
existed no statutory law applicable to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral award in India. The earlier enactments 
viz., the Indian Arbitration Act of 1S89 and the Second 
Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908) did not 
contain any provision relating specifically to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India. Several 
u 
changes in the Indian Arbitral Act of 1889 were recommended 
in 19S5 by the Civil Justice Committee to ameliorate the 
Situation 
However, the Indian Courts devised short term remedies 
by way of interpretation of Indian legislative enactments 
whenever they were approached to decide cases involving 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. For instance 
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section 19 of the 1889 Act conferred on courts some 
discretion to grant stay of local action in such cases. The 
Indian Courts (just as English Courts do) exercised 
jurisdiction for stay of legal proceedings in those cases. 
Where under the terms of contract, parties have agreed to 
refer all their disputes to the court of a particular 
country. The parties also could have taken the stay where 
they, in contravention of the terms of contract, filed a 
legal proceeding in the court of another country. 
The question of interpretation of Section 19 of the 
1889 Act, had come before the Indian courts in several 
cases. Ijn. Mar itt imia Ital iana Steamship Co. V/S Bur jor 
if 
Framroz Rustomj i the contract stipulated that all 
disputes will be decided by Italian Court. The court held 
that the stipulation was enforceable and granted the stay of 
Indian Suit. In this case, A, shipped goods by B's steamer 
for conveyance to Bombay under a bill of lading of which the 
material portion was Clause 27 saying "Failing an amicable 
Zt 
understanding, either the Shipper or consignee desiring to 
proceed against the company in Court of law, can do 
so " only before judicial authority in Geneva, Neples, 
Caglian or Venice, in case of a dispute for not more than 
Liras 500; and only before judicial authority in Geneva for 
sum over that amount as is the position in the present 
case". The goods on arrival were found to be damaged. A, 
Brought a suit in the Bombay High Court for damages, but B, 
took out Summons for stay of the Suit under Section 19 of 
Indian Arbitration Act 1989 by virtue of the above Clause. 
The trial Judge refused to grant Stay. It was contended by 
the defendant that under Section 28 of the Indian Contract 
Act , the said Clause was void because it excluded 
absolutely, the Jurisdiction of the Courts. While 
upholding the contention the court agreed upto the point 
that so far as an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts were concerned it was undoubtedly, void under Section 
28, but turning to the clause excluding the jurisdiction, 
under Contract the material portion of which, commenced with 
the words. "The shipper and the receiver or any other 
person interested in the cargo expressly renouncing the 
competence of any other judicial authority", which does not 
have the effect of making whole clause void because it says 
that what is to be void is only that portion which relates 
to the ouster of jurisdiction. 
While extracting the reason as to why and for what 
z. 
purpose the clause of such a nature was inserted in the Bill 
of Lading, the court observed that defendant was Italian 
Steamship Co. with its head office at Geneva and having an 
agency at Bombay. The ship was flying the Italian flag and 
the Bill of Lading was in Italian form which did not 
commence with the words usually found in an English Bill of 
Lading, "Shipped in good order and condition". There would, 
therefore, be sufficient reason for the shipping Company to 
desire the law applicable to the contract of affreightment 
to be the Italian laws and that they should for that reason 
inserted the Clause in the Bill Lading which was the subject 
matter of stay application. Finally, court came to 
conclusion that the Clause was valid submission under 
Section H of the Arbitration Act , to the Judicial authority 
in Geneva and that the Suit, in absence of any other 
circumstances, be stayed pending the decision of that court. 
It is submitted with due respect that the reasoning 
given by the court seems odd to the broad principle of legal 
Jurispudence. The court failed to recognise one's right to 
take recourse to the courts of its country in getting his 
grievances redressed. Their Lordship's inference drawn from 
the fact that Italian steamship flying the Italian flag 
carrying Italian form of Bill Lading were sufficient grounds 
as to the law applicable to such a contract of affreightment 
was "Italian' law and consequently established the fact that 
the parties to that contract renounced the applicability of 
2o 
any other system of law is unconvincing. Plaintiff, being a 
citizen of Indian was entitled to proceed for damages caused 
by defendant's steamship Co. on account of improper 
ventilation because of two reasons. First, the cause of 
action arose at Bombay the port of discharge. Secondly, the 
defendant steamship Co. had its agency at Bombay too. 
Their Lordship also ignored the fundamental concept of 
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'Mutuality' in the contract of affreightment, which not 
only determine the nature of the contract of affreightment 
but also establishes the validity of the submission made 
under Section S of the Arbitration Act . 
The clause in question did not provide for 'mutuality' 
because the ship owner was not bound to file suit against 
the consignor or consignee in Geneva. Clause 27 of the Bill 
lading only stipulated "that failing such an 
amicable understanding, either shipper or consignee, 
desiring to proceed against the company in the court of law, 
can do so before the judicial authority in Geneva". The 
clause further provided that the "shipper or receiver or any 
other person, interested in the cargo expressly renouncing 
the competency of any other judicial authority." 
The material portion of above referred clause much more 
resembles with that of standard form of contract, wherein 
only one party dictates the terms and conditions of a 
contract. Thus, how could there be mutuality where the ship 
I > f 1 z 
owner was not bound to file suit against the consignee in 
Geneva. Since, there was no mutuality the clause was not a 
valid submission under Section S of the Arbitration Act. 
Therefore suit ought not to have been stayed. 
Their Lordship also failed to interpret Section 28 of 
the contract Act. under Sec S8, "an agreement which wholly 
or partially prohibits any party from enforcing his rights 
under or in respect of any contract is void to 'that 
extent'"'. The clause E7 in the said Bill Lading was void 
because it absolutely excluded the jurisdiction of the court 
to only one of the parties to a contract of affreightment. 
Similarly, an agreement ousting the jurisdiction of the 
court was also against the 'public policy' of India. 
The stay could have even refused to be granted by their 
Lordship on the ground that all necessary evidence for 
determination of the disputes in the suit were available at 
Bombay, the port of discharge. 
A similar remedy was awarded by the Judicial Committee 
of Privy Council the in the Oppenhiem and Co. V/S Hajee 
9 
Mohd. Haneef Saheb , Where the Respondent agreed to supply 
sheepskin to the Appellant in London, and any dispute 
arising was agreed upon to be referred to arbitration at 
that place. The plaintiff Oppenhiem 8, Co. claimed that the 
quality of sheepskin supplied, was of inferior quality and 
it sold the goods with the consent of Respondent and claimed 
the differences in price by way of damages. An arbitrator 
was appointed by Appellant and Respondent was given notice 
of it stating that if he failed to appoint his arbitrator, 
the arbitrator appointed by Appellant would be the sole 
arbitrator. The arbitrator awarded the differences after 
having read the contract and correspondence. A suit was 
brought before Madras High Court against the said award-
Respondent pleaded that he had no notice from the arbitrator 
who has committed irregularity. 
The suit was heard by Mr. Justice Coutts Throtter who 
held that plea of want of notice can not be raised by way 
defence in the suit. The court observed that the grievance 
of the Respondent was more imaginary than real. The award 
was made by a commercial man who took the commercial 
documents with which he was familiar and saw the goods and 
gave his opinion on the spot. 
The learned Justice added that had the objection been 
raised in the proceeding, he would have felt constrained to 
give effect to it. The court referred to Thorburn V/S. 
Branes for the proposition that according to the English 
law any objection relating to irregularity in bringing an 
award into existence must be taken by motion under the 
English Arbitration Act of 1889 to set aside or remit the 
award and if not so taken, can not be raised by way of 
defence to an action on the award. He therefore, held that 
defence of such a nature was not open to him in the suit. 
Against this judgment, an appeal was brought and was allowed 
by the Appellate Division. The learned judge held that the 
rule in Thorburn V/S. Branes does not apply in India. 
Thereupon, the present appeal was brought. 
In their Lordships' opinion Mr. Justice Coutts Throtter 
came out with right decision and the appeal was to succeed. 
Their Lordship, held that the contract was made and to be 
performed in England. The Arbitration clause provided for 
arbitration which was to take place in London in accordance 
with English law and procedure. Under English law by which 
both the parties agreed to be bound, any objection to an 
award on the ground of misconduct or irregularity on the 
part of arbitrator must be taken by motion under the 
Arbitration Act, 1889 and if not so taken, can not be 
pleaded as an answer to an action on award. If no such 
motion is made within time limit by Order 6^, Rule 1^ of the 
Supreme Court of England, the award becomes fully binding on 
both the parties as if it has been incorporated in the 
contract. Any defence going to the root of the award e.g. 
that arbitrator had no jurisdiction or that the matter was 
tainted with fraud could have been pleaded in the suit; but 
a defence on the ground of irregularity not appearing on 
the face of the award was excluded by law of which both the 
parties had agreed to be bound. 
It is submitted with due respect that their Lordship 
viU 
did not pause over the hardship causing to the respondent in 
bringing the suit regarding irregularity in arbitral process 
which was being held far away in England. 
Therefore, the reference made by the court to Thorburn 
V/S. Sranes as a complete authority seems inappropriate and 
totally unconvincing. Since no such notice was given to the 
Respondent by the arbitrator that he was proceeding to 
arbitrate the dispute, the action upon judgment of King 
Bench Division of England could not be maintained as the 
Judgment had been entered in default of appearance and the 
action had not been tried upon its merits and that the claim 
under the contract was barred by Limitation Act. Therefore, 
the award, was not binding upon Respondent as no notice was 
given to him by arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute. 
Actually the arbitral process was plagued by error 
since the suit was brought by the Appellant against 
Respondent at the High Court of Judicature at Madras 
claiming the differences due under the Judgement of King 
Bench Division of England. Against this judgement an appeal 
was brought and allowed by the Appellate Division of the 
Privy Counc i1. 
Basically, the question which ought to have been 
pleaded or contended at any stage of proceeding should have 
been that award had merged into a English Judgment and 
therefore, claim based on the award was not maintainable. 
iil 
It is further submitted that the case seems not to have 
been decided on merit, because the question which ought to 
have been considered was that of conflict of laws rather 
than irregularity in the arbitral process in making the 
award. There were two courts involved in this case, First, 
the court where award was passed and Secondly the court 
where the award was sought to be enforced. 
CB)ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS AFTER THE ACT OF 1937 
India acceded to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration 
Clause of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on Execution of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. It also became party to 
the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958. It enacted the Arbitration 
12 (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 to give effect to the 
Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention. It also gave effect 
to the New York Convention by enacting the Foreign Awards 
13 (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 . The Act of 1937 
did not govern the awards made after 11th October 1960 
arising out of the counties which were the signatories to 
the 1958 Convention. The Act of 1937 adopted the then 
prevailing scheme and practice of arbitration and 
enforcement of the resultant awards, embodied in the Geneva 
Convention and Geneva Protocol. The Foreign Awards Act, 
1961 ensured recognition and enforcement of foreign award in 
India in accordance with the procedure and Scheme evolved 
under New York Convention. 
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Both the Acts were modeled on the same line. However, 
the latter differed from the former in respect of burden of 
proof relating to the cases involving enforcement of foreign 
1 A-
arbitral awards. The Act of 1937 under section (7)(l)(d) 
imposed on the party seeking enforcement of foreign award a 
duty to establish the validity of award and its finality in 
the country in which it was made. In practice, the validity 
and finality of an award under the Act of 1937, could only 
be proved by producing an exequatur (leave for enforcement 
or like) issued by the court in the country in which the 
award was made. This requirement in its ultimate analysis, 
amounted to a cumbersome and time consuming system of 
'double-exequatur' because the party was also required to 
take leave for enforcement in the country in which the award 
was sought to be enforced. 
The Act of 1961, under section (7) on the other hand 
enjoined the defendant to prove that the award was not 
enforceable. In other words, the 1961 Act, presumed that an 
award filed in accordance with the procedure incorporated 
under section 5 of Act was valid, until contrary was proved 
by the recalcitrant party . In this way the burden was not 
only shifted on the shoulder of contesting party, but was 
also reduced to some extent under the Act of 1961. 
The underlying reason for the need of cumbersome and 
time consuming system of double-exequatur under the Act of 
ii6 
The New York Convention, 1958 had been successful in 
bringing the idea of free trade regime in its ambit and 
thus, the system of double exequatur in the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral award did not find its place under the 
Convention. Since India had given effect to the New York 
Convention in the shape of the Foreign Awards Act 1961, the 
same approach had also been transported in the Act wherein 
the said system was abolished. 
The Act of 1937 and of 1961, were simultaneously 
operative in respect of the enforcement of a foreign award 
in India. The reasons for such an operation were two fold. 
Firstly, India being a State signatory to the Geneva 
Convention and Protocol on which the Act of 1937 was based, 
the obligation undertaken thereunder continued to bind India 
with regard to the award resultant of disputes between the 
member States of the said Convention and the Protocol. 
Secondly, since India had also ratified the New York 
Convention, 1958 and given effect to it by enacting the Act 
of 1961, its obligation also continued to bind India with 
reference to the awards coming out of the arbitration held 
on a dispute between the contracting states to the New York 
Convention 1958. Therefore, the Act of 1937 was applicable 
for the recognition and enforcement of a award in India 
resulted from arbitration held between those states who were 
not the parties to the New York Convention but were 
6'i 
1937 was perhaps, derived from the prevailing notions of 
state sovereignty. The juridical notion of sovereignty of 
state was based on the idea of freedom from any external 
interference in its internal policy. That is why no country 
allows an award to be enforced if it violates its public 
policy or is contrary to its own procedural law. The theory 
of Sovereignty gave rise to dispensation of justice by leave 
and licence. A foreign award may have world wide 
recognition in respect of its nature but different legal 
systems on account of their policies take different view as 
to its legal effect. The system of double exequatur, which 
derived its force from the theory of legal sovereignty was 
applied absolutely by the courts in India until the 
ratification of the New York Convention, 1958. The growth 
of commercial activities by the states coupled with the role 
of UNO in promoting barrier free trade regime, have made the 
systems of dispensation of justice by leave and license 
absurd and led to inconvenience. With the emergence of free 
trade blocks viz, SFTA, NAFTA, EEC, and SAARC etc. and 
coming into force of the world Trade Organisation (W.T.O) 
with the motto to transact each other without any kind of 
hindrance in the last fifty years, have completely 
transformed the function of sovereign states. This 
transformation consequently, brought changes in 
international law relating to Sovereignty. Even many 
countries have departed from the rule of absolute immunity. 
cio 
signatory to the Geneva Convention, 19E7 and Geneva 
Protocol, 1983. 
The Bombay High Court in Francesco Corsi V/5 
17 Gorakhram was inter alia, called upon to adjudicate one of 
the preliminary issues as to whether the Protocol Act 1937 
was still applicable for the enforcement of a foreign award 
in India, the court observed that : "India being a state 
signatory to the Protocol and Convention the 
obligation undertaken thereunder continue to bind India, 
after India was constitute a Domain and they continue to 
bind India thereafter". 
A question whether the Indian Arbitration Act, 19^0 
which consolidated and amended the law relating to 
arbitration in India, being a lex fori was applicable to 
foreign awards, deserved attention. Indian courts had taken 
the position that it was applicable to foreign awards if 
18 both the Acts of 1937 and of 1961 were inapplicable 
Now a brief description of the position before the 
advent of the law relating to arbitration in India brings us 
to conclude that prior to 1937 Indian Court used to take 
recourse of such an enactments which did not contain any 
provision with regard to enforcement of foreign award in 
India. The courts devised short terms remedies by way of 
interpretation of the then existing statute viz the Indian 
Arbitration Act, 1S89 whenever they were approached to 
do 
decide the cases concerning the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award in India. Such an use of statute which was 
concerned in no way to the problems dealt with, 
consequently, brought discretion in the hand of courts to 
decide the cases of enforcement of foreign arbitral award 
not in accordance with any codified law on the subject but 
by extracting the authority by way of interpretation of 
Indian Arbitration Act 1889 which did not contain any 
provision in respect of enforcement of a foreign award in 
India. 
The deficiency arising in respect of enforcement of 
foreign arbitration award in India prior to 1937 was that 
the parties owing to the said discretion in the hand of 
courts, could have easily taken stay of legal proceedings 
even in the cases where under the term of contract, parties 
had agreed upon to refer all their dispute to the court of a 
particular country. The parties to the arbitration 
agreement could also have taken 'stay' where they in 
contravention of the term of contract launched legal 
proceeding in the court of another country. Lack of 
specific provisions with regard to enforcement of foreign 
award in India coupled with the discretionary power of 
granting stay of a legal proceeding by the court by virtue 
of interpretation of the then existing statutes were 
considered great obstruction in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award in India prior to 1937. 
1 f] 
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of which that award was made; or 
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Chapter - II 
MEANING, EFFECT AND FILING OF FOREIGN AUARD 
In the preceding chapter an attempt has been made to 
formulate the general problems relating to enforcement of 
foreign awards in India in its historical perspective. In 
order to make this study more meaningful, it is inevitable 
to delve into the meaning and scope of the term 'foreign 
award' which not only constituted the key term in both the 
Acts regulating the subject of discussion viz., The 
Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937 and The 
Foreign Award (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, but 
also highlighted the scope of the said Acts. 
The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration clauses, 19E3, 
recognised the right of contracting state to limit its 
obligation created by the Protocol and that of the 
subsequent Geneva Convention supplementing the Protocol to 
recognise a contract made only "in the territory of another 
contracting state' and to contract which were 'considered 
commercial under its national law '. The New York 
Convention 1958 also permitted the contracting state to make 
two reservations to limit its obligation to recognise an 
arbitral agreement and an arbitral award as binding and 
enforceable. They were (i) that the Convention would be 
applicable to the recognition and enforcement of awards made 
only in the territory of another contracting state; and 
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(ii) that the Convention would be applicable only to 
differences arising out of legal relationship, whether, 
contractual or not, which were considered 'commercial' under 
the national law of the state making such declaration . 
India had ratified the Geneva Convection and Protocol 
and the New York Convention, subject to the said 
reservations and the same were incorporated in the Act of 
1937 and of 19<bl. Both the Acts, were accordingly, made 
applicable only to the 'foreign award' resulting from 
difference arising out of legal relationship, which, by the 
law in force in India, were considered 'Commercial'. At the 
same time, there existed no explanation to the word 
'Commercial' in the said Acts, which, consequently led to 
great difficulties to comprehend the exact content of the 
term 'foreign award' as a sole criteria to make the Acts of 
1937 and 1961 applicable in enforcing foreign awards in 
Ind ia. 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to elaborate 
the meaning and effect of 'foreign award'. This may very 
well be discussed under three headings viz; (i) definitions 
of the term foreign award under the Act of 1937 and of 1961 
(ii) what constitutes, commercial matter ? and, (iii) Effect 
of the foreign award in India. The procedure of filing a 
foreign award in India has also been placed in its proper 
context. 
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{A) FOREIGN AWARD 
The definition accorded to the term 'foreign award' by 
the Act of 1937 as well as the Act of 1961 was not free from 
ambiguity. The courts' interpretation of the term had also 
not been satisfactory. Generally speaking, the term foreign 
award was used to be in "connection with arbitration in 
foreign land by foreign arbitrators, to which foreign law 
was applicable and in which a foreign national was 
involved". 
The term 'foreign award' defined under Section E of the 
Geneva 1937 Act was as follows ; 
In this Act 'Foreign Award' means an award on 
differences relating the matters considered as commercial 
under the law in force in India made after the HSth day of 
July, 192^,-
(a) in pursuance of an agreement for arbitration to which 
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the Protocol set forth in the First schedule applies, 
and (b) between persons of whom one is subject to the 
Jurisdiction of some one of such powers as the Central 
Government, being satisfied, that reciprocal provisions 
have been made, may, by notification in the official 
Gazette, declare to be parties to the Convention set 
forth in the Second Schedule , and of whom the other is 
subject to the jurisdiction of some other of the Powers 
aforesaid law. 
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(c) in one of such territories as the central Government, 
being satisfied that reciprocal provisions have been 
made, may, by like notification, declare to be 
territories to which the said Convention applies. 
Section S of the Act of 1961, defined the term foreign 
award in the following words; 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the 
'Foreign Award' means an award on differences between 
persons arising out of legal relationships whether 
contractual or not, considered as 'Commercial' under the law 
in force in India, made on or after the 11th day of October, 
19<b0 -
(a) in pursuance of an agreement in writing for arbitration 
to which the Convention set for the in the Schedule 
applies and (b) in one of such territories as Central 
Government, being satisfied that reciprocal provisions 
have been made, may, by notification in official 
Gazette, declare to be territories to which the said 
Convention applies. 
A careful reading of these sections revealed that under 
both the Acts an award was treated as 'foreign award' when 
it was given to the parties who were the subject to two 
national jurisdictions and whose contractual rights and 
obligations were governed by two different legal systems. 
Both the sections warranted that an award, to come within 
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the purview of their respective enactments, required that -
<a) it arisen of a contract which was considered 
'commercial' under the law in force in India and it was 
made in pursuance of an agreement for arbitration to 
which the Geneva Protocol or Convention set forth 
respectively in the Schedules of the 1937 and 1961 Acts 
applied, and 
(b) the award had been made in a territory to which the 
Geneva Convention (in case of 1937 Act) and the New 
York Convention (in case of 1961 Act) had been made 
applicable by the Central Government. 
However, the differences between the two sections were 
as follows. (A) The Act of Act of 1937 did not require the 
agreement for arbitration to be in writing, while 
applicability of Section (2) of the 1961, Act was 
conditioned as existence of a written agreement between the 
parties concerned. 
(B> The Act of 1937 applied to any kind of 'Commercial' 
dispute but the Act 1961, regulated the 'Commercial' 
dispute arising out of legal relationship. 
Thus, the scope of the Act of 1937 was much wider with 
regard to the definition accorded to the terms 'foreign 
award' by the Act. Nevertheless the provision of both the 
Acts were applicable to the foreign award related to the 
0[) 
matter considered to be 'commercial' under the law in force 
in India. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMERCIAL MATTER ? : Non-existence of any 
explanation to the word "commercial' led to great difficulty 
to comprehend the exact meaning and content of the term 
'foreign award' which not only constituted the key term in 
both the Acts but also determined the applicability of the 
said Acts. 
The New York Convention, 1958 enabled the parties 
signatory to it to restrict their obligation to recognise an 
arbitral agreement and arbitral award as binding and to be 
enforceable in accordance with their nationals rules and 
6 procedures . 
The Geneva Protocol also recognised the right of a 
contracting state to ratify the Protocol and the subsequent 
7 Convention subject, to 'Commercial' reservation . India had 
ratified the New York Convention and the Geneva Convention 
and Protocol subject to the said "Commercial' reservation 
wherein the provisions of the Act of 19761 and of 1937 
applied only to foreign award which arose out of the matters 
considered as 'commercial'. 
The terms "foreign award' came up for discussion before 
the Bombay High Court in Kamani Engineer inq Corporation V/S 
g 
Societe De Traction Et D' Electricite Societe Anonyme . The 
court observed that : 
t)i 
It is difficult to find out the exact meaning of the 
phrase "matters considered as "commercial under the law in 
force in India" as mentioned in Section (E) of the Act, 
1937. 
The court was called upon to decide as to whether an 
agreement providing necessary technical assistance for the 
construction of overhead equipment for railway 
electrification, tramway systems and Trolley Buses in India, 
Burma, Cylon (Sri lanka) and Nepal, could be considered as 
"commercial' under the law in force in India. The defendant 
had also agreed to train persons sent by the plaintiff at 
his office at, Brussel. The remuneration for this work was 
described as "fees" and was fixed on percentage basis. 
The plaintiff had brought into the notice of Bombay 
High Court, the observation of the Supreme Court of India in 
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At iyabari Tea Co. Ltd. V/S State of Assam that "movement' 
of goods from place to place is not only essential 
ingredient of import Trade and Commerce but communication of 
information, supply of energy etc. also do indicate the 
'Commercial' intercourse". 
While rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that 
contract must be considered "commercial' K.K., Desai. J. 
observed that : 
"The contract is on the face of it only a contract for 
technical assistance. The contract does not involve the 
Defendant into any business of Plaintiffs. It is not in any 
sense, a participation in profit between the parties. The 
remuneration of Defendants is for that reason described as 
'fees' and only on the percentage basis. By the contract 
the defendant refused to be involved into any business of 
plaintiffs and or any contract of plaintiffs. They have 
scrupulously kept themselves out of any commercial relation 
with the plaintiffs. In my view, the contract is more like 
a retainer or the contract that is made between solicitor, a 
counsel and an advocate on the one hand and client on the 
other- It is difficult to describe such a contract as 
'commercial'." 
It is submitted with due respect that above reasoning 
given by his Lordship for not treating an agreement to 
provide technical assistance as 'commercial' seems odd with 
his liberal bent to give 'widest meaning' to the term 
'commerc ial' . 
The Bombay High Court in Indian Organic Chemicals Ltd. 
V. Chemtrix Fibre Inco. Speaking through Mridul J., 
however, refused to apply the dicta of Kamani Engineering to 
an agreement providing for an establishment and production 
of Polyster Stable Fibre in India including, inter alia, 
agreement providing for technical know-how, supply of 
information and services. Accordingly, court offered 
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liberal interpretation to the terms 'commercial' to cover 
the cases of technical assistance and supply of information. 
But when again the same question arose before the Calcutta 
High Court in Joseph Miesaner GMBR &. Co. V. Kanor ia Chemical 
and Industr ies Ltd.. as to determine the meaning of the 
term "commercial', the court relying on the Kamani 
Engineering's case held that the technical collaboration 
agreement between an Indian and foreign firm merely for 
supplying the technical know-how and expertise for exchange 
of 'fees', where no participation in the profit was 
involved, could not be viewed as 'commercial' tran-saction, 
within the meaning of Section (E) of the Foreign Awards Act, 
1961. 
It is, however, needless to mention that keeping in 
mind the statement of objects and reasons of both the Acts 
of 1937 and of 1961, under which more emphasis was given to 
facilitate the speedy settlement of dispute through 
arbitration, the term 'commercial' ought to have been given 
the widest possible meaning to bring in its ambit all 
relationships including the case of technical assistance. 
The term 'commercial' which undoubtedly, has its origin 
from the terms 'commerce' which is an expression of wide 
import and embraces every communication and business 
activities and intercourse including the transportation, 
purchase, sale, exchange of commodities and supply of infor-
mation and technical assistance between the subjects of two 
states. 
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The Webster Third New International Dictionary gives 
the meaning of the word 'commercial' as "if in or relating 
to; as (a) : occupied with or engaged in commerce 
(a-establishment) (b) : related to dealing with commerce 
(b-treaty)". Etymologically, therefore, the expression 
commercial relationship has taken its colour from the word 
commerce, which connotes a relationship arising out of 
'commerce'. 
The word "commercial' according to Jowitt's Dictionary 
of English, means "The intercourse of nations in each others 
produce and manufacturers in which the superfluities of any 
one given for those of another and then re-exchanged with 
other nations for mutual wants. 
Several reputed judgments show that the term "commerce' 
IE is a word of wide import. X H Wei son V. IJissor i — Field J. 
speaking for the Supreme Court of U.S. observed that : 
"Commerce is a term of largest import. It comprehends 
intercourse for the purpose of trade in any and all its 
form, including the transportation, purchase, sale and 
exchange of commodities between the citizen of one country 
and the citizen subject of another country and between the 
citizen of different states". 
13 In Automobile Transport Ltd. Y. State of Rajasthan , 
Hidayatullah J.(as he then was) referred the classic 
OJ 
definition of the terms 'commerce' given by Marshal C^ J^ jjl 
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Gibbons V. Qdqen in the following words; "commerce, 
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more; it is 
intercourse." 
It is worth mentioning that a committee on Commercial 
Arbitration was constituted by the Government of India in 
1963 to review the then existing arrangement for arbitration 
of commercial disputes of foreign nature and to recommend 
appropriate measure for their improvement. Subsequently, 
the committee in its report referring the Kamani 
Enq ineer inq had interalia, recommended that the word 
'Commercial' be amended so as to include the agreement for 
technical assistance and know-how advice 
The real question is as to how the term 'Commercial' is 
understood in the modern world. In a particular case, it 
would be of great importance to know whether the legal 
relationship arising out of which the arbitration came into 
existence was or was not a commercial relationship. 
Internationally, a wide interpretation to the term 
'commercial' is helpful. The problem arises on account of 
narrow interpretation accorded to the term 'commercial' by a 
particular country. The relationship, which is regarded as 
'commercial' by one country need not necessarily be so 
regarded by other. The terms of common use tend to elude 
definition, "When I use a word", Said a well known literary 
character, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither 
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more nor less' . It would be unfair to say the same to 
those who speak or write about the term 'commercial'. 
Indeed, the commercial reservation made by India to the 
New York Convention, 1958 brought the flood of litigations 
concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in 
India which consequently undermined not only the scope the 
New York Convention, but also applicability of the Foreign 
Awards Act, 1961. 
(.B) EFFECT OF A FOREIGN AWARD 
The two earlier enactments viz. the Protocol Act 1937 
and the Foreign Awards Act 1961, contained provisions on 
effect of a foreign award. Section 4 of the Protocol Act of 
1937 dealt with the effect of a foreign award as follows; 
i) a foreign award shall, subject to the provision of the 
Act be enforceable in India as it were an ward made on 
a matter referred to arbitration in India, 
ii) any foreign award which would be enforceable under this 
Act shall be treated as binding for all purposes on the 
persons as between whom it was made, and may 
accordingly, be relied on by any of those person by way 
of defence, set off or otherwise in any legal 
proceeding in India and any reference in this Act to 
enforcing a foreign award shall be construed as 
including references to relying on an award. 
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Section ^ of the 1961 Act was identical with the 
provision of Section 4 of the Protocol Act of 1937. 
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In Francesco Corsi V/S Gorakhram Gokulchand the 
Bombay High Court was, interalia, called upon to determine 
the content and meaning of the phrase "as if it were an 
award made on a matter referred to arbitration in india" 
employed under Section 4 of the Protocol Act of 1937 which 
equated foreign award with that of domestic award and in 
ultimate analysis, assimilated the procedures for the 
enforcement of foreign award with that of Indian award. 
Relying on the phraseology of Section 4(1), it was contended 
that a foreign award was at par with a domestic award under 
Arbitration Act of 1940 and hence, an application for filing 
a foreign award in India must be treated as an application 
for filing an award under the Act of 1940 and therefore, the 
provisions of the Indian Limitation Act be made applicable 
to such award. The court outlining the procedures for 
filing an award under the Protocol Act of 1937 and the 
Arbitration Act of 1940 and difference between the two Acts, 
categorically rejected the said plea and held : 
"Merely because a foreign award is enforceable in India 
as if it were made on matter referred to arbitration in 
India, it does not make that award, an award under the 
19 Indian Arbitration Act, 1940" 
However, Court refused to apply the procedure of filing 
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a domestic award to a foreign award. 
However, a contrary view with respect to the effect of 
a foreign award and the applicability of domestic procedural 
laws for enforcement of such award was expressed by the 
Gujrat High Court in Or lent Middle East 1ines Ltd• V. Brace 
SO 
Transport Corporat ion of Monrovia while considering a 
review petition under Section 5(1) of the Foreign Awards Act 
El 1961 , the court upheld the contention that Section ^(1) of 
the said Act, which corresponded to the Section ^(1) of the 
Protocol Act, 19378 read with Article III of the New York 
Convention prime facie shows that a foreign award is to be 
deemed to be an award made under the Arbitration Act of 
19^0, so far as its enforcement is concerned and hence, 
procedural laws of India, including the Limitation Act will 
govern the procedural aspect of filing of a foreign award. 
The Court, doubting the legislative intent to exclude the 
applicability of the Limitation Act to filing a foreign 
award in India and questioning the propriety of 
entertaining, unlike a domestic award, an application for 
enforcement of a foreign award in India, at any time, 
refused to pursue the dicta of the Francesco Corsi's case. 
J.P. Desai J.. speaking for Gujrat High Court, 
substantiated his view that Section '^(1) of the Act of 1961 
allowed application of domestic procedural law, except when 
it is inconsistent with the procedure laid down in the same 
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with regard to the enforcement of a foreign award in India. 
The learned judge further observed : "... we do not 
find any answer to the question as to for what purpose 
Section ^(1) of the Act of 1937 which is pari materia with 
Section ^(1) of the Act 1961, was enacted unless it was 
intended to lay down that, except, when the procedure laid 
down in the Indian statute was inconsistent with the 
provision of the Act, the said procedure has to be 
follQwed"^^. 
Section A-(1 ) of the Act 1937 and Section ^td) of the 
Act 1961 read with the corresponding Article of the New York 
Convention, clearly, go to show that the procedural law of 
the country on which the award is relied upon would govern 
the procedural aspect of the filing of an award and that 
would include the question of limitation as being a 
procedural one. Thus, it can not be said that it was 
intended by legislature that a domestic award can be 
enforced only within a particular time and a foreign award 
can be enforced at any time. Learned judge further said 
that it is difficult to agree with respect to reason given 
23 in the Fransesco Cosi's case that legislative intention 
was that a foreign award can be enforced at any time, though 
a domestic award can be enforced within a particular time. 
Pii. 
Learned judge elaborated the point that Article (1) of the 
said Convention also provided that the rule of the procedure 
of the territory where the award was relied upon had to be 
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followed. Provision as regard to the limitation which bared 
the filing of a proceeding after a certain period of time is 
procedural one and therefore, they form the part of 
procedural law. The decision of Bombay High Court does not 
come in any way in considering the question of jurisdiction, 
even assuming the Limitation Act may not apply, the learned 
judge with due respect said that he is not incline to agree 
with the reason given in the said case. 
In the case referred herein above court delivered its 
judgments on a different footing. In the former, the court 
gave importance to the raison d'etre and scheme for 
enforcement of foreign awards in India and refused to apply 
the Limitation Act to ensure its enforcement, while in the 
latter the court probed into procedural law and rules 
embodied in the Civil Procedure Code for determination of 
jurisdiction of the court in India to entertain an 
application for enforcement of foreign award. 
Thus, the above referred cases demonstrated that award 
made under the Protocol Act of 1937, were entirely different 
from that rendered under Indian Arbitration Act of 1940. 
The language, employed in Section A- of the Act 1937 which 
was identical with the provision of Section h of the 1961 
Act was full of intricacies. Now such an ambiguity has been 
removed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 
1996, which has been discussed in the ensuing chapter. 
6i 
(C) FILING OF FOREIGN AWARD IN INDIAN COURT 
Any person interested in a foreign award could make an 
application to a court having jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the award, to allow him to file the award in the 
court. In this respect the provision of both the Act of 
1961 and of 1937 were identical, but the manner prescribed 
under the Arbitration Act, 19A-0 was entirely different from 
that was prescribed under the said two Acts. 
Under the 1937 Act, a party seeking enforcement was 
required to file an application together with the; 
(a) original award or its duly authenciated copy as per 
requirement of the country in which it was made. (b) 
evidence proving the finality of the ward in the 
country of its origin. 
(c) evidence proving that the award was a foreign award, 
(d) evidence proving that award was made in pursuance 
of an agreement for arbitration valid under the law by 
which it was governed. 
(e) evidence proving that award was made by a tribunal 
provided for in the agreement or constituted in manner 
agreed by the parties. 
(f) award was made in conformity with the law governing the 
arbitration procedure 
If the foreign arbitral award or any related document 
required to be produced along with the application was in a 
foreign language, it was obligatory on the party seeking 
enforcement to produce an English version of the document(s) 
certified by a diplomatic or consular agent of the country 
of the party or in any other sufficient manner in accordance 
with the law in force in India . The similar provision 
dealing with production of evidence and the requirement to 
be complied with by the party applied for enforcement for a 
foreign award was there in the Act of 1961 . However, 
there were two striking differences between the said two 
Acts. 
First, the Act of 1961, unlike the 1937 Act, did not 
insist the party applying for enforcement of foreign award, 
to prove finality of that award. Secondly, it also did not 
require the party either to prove that the award was made in 
pursuance of an agreement valid according to its governing 
law or it was made by the agreed tribunal (or a tribunal 
constituted in agreed manner) in conformity with the law 
governing the arbitration procedure. Under the Act of 1961, 
the only mandatory thing was that party applied for 
enforcement of a foreign award had to produce the original 
award (or its authenticated copy in the manner required by 
the law of the country in which it was made); the original 
agreement for arbitration (or its duty certificate copy) and 
necessary evidence to prove that the award was a foreign 
award. The requirement of English version of the copy of 
OJ 
the award or related document was required in both the Acts. 
Hence, evidence was to be produced at the time of 
filing application for enforcement of a foreign award under 
the Act of 1961 was less difficult to comply with. 
There was a remarkable difference between the Indian 
Arbitration Act, 19^+0 and the 1937 Act with regard to the 
manner of filing of an award. The manner of filing of an 
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award under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 was 
prescribed under Section 14 wherein the arbitrator was bound 
to sign the award and send the written notice to the parties 
thereof, and that at the request of any party to the 
arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such 
party or at the command of the court the arbitrator was 
supposed to file the award in the court on payment of the 
fees and charges due in respect of arbitration and award. 
So the procedure of filing of a foreign award under the Act 
of 1937 as well as the 1961 Act differed from the procedure 
prescribed under the Act of 1940. Unlike the Act of 1940, 
there was no provision in the Act of 1937 and of 1961, for a 
notice to the arbitrator or of any direction to the 
arbitrator for the production of an award or the arbitration 
proceedings. The only notice envisaged under the Act of 
1937 and of 1961 was a notice to the respondent to show 
cause, why the award should not be filed. Under the 
Arbitrator Act of 1940, a duty was imposed upon the 
arbitrators to cause an award, or a signed copy of it, to be 
bt 
filed in court under the circumstances mentioned in that 
section. When the arbitrator or umpire sent the award to 
the court for the purpose of being filed in the court, it 
was the duty of the court to file the award and give the 
parties notice of it. In Mury Exportation V/S. D. Khai ten 
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and Sons Ltd. in which a foreign award was challenged 
inter alia, on ground that the foreign arbitration had 
proceeded in spite of notice of the filing of the suit in 
India, and therefore, the further arbitration proceedings 
and the resultant award was invalid under Section 35 of the 
Act of 19^0. The Calcutta High court held that the Act of 
1937 and 1940 are two statutes governing different kind of 
arbitration, and to introduce section of one Act to regulate 
the arbitration under the other Act would create confusion 
30 
and contradiction which was not intended by legislature 
Four year later the Bombay High Court too shared the same 
view expressed by the Calcutta High Court, in Francesco 
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corsi V. Gorakhram and refused to equate the procedure for 
filing an award under the 1937 Act to that under the 19A-0 
Act. Again in 1983, the Delhi High Court in Ludwiq Wunsche 
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&. Co. V/s. Raunaq International Ltd. expressed the similar 
view in establishing connection between the Arbitration Act, 
1940, and the Act of 1961 and of 1937, as far as filing of 
an application in India for enforcement of a foreign award 
is concerned. 
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However J.P. Desai J. of Gujrat High Court while 
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determining the jurisdiction of a court in India for filing 
a foreign award for enforcement under Section 5 of the 
Foreign Awards Act of 1961 , coupled with the applicability 
of the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 or 
of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 or of any other 
statute in enforcement of foreign award in India, opined 
that while enforcing a foreign award in India one has to 
look into provisions of the Foreign Awards Act and the 
procedure laid down therein. But if the 1961 Act is silent 
with regard to any procedural aspect, a court can take 
recourse to the Code of Civil Procedure as well as any other 
statute, while considering the procedure to be adopted for 
enforcing a foreign award under the Foreign Awards 
(Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961. His Lordship 
uninfluenced by the earlier decisions refused to accept the 
contention that the Act of 1961 constituted a self-contained 
code as for as enforcement of a foreign award in India was 
concerned and that a court could not resort to any other 
procedural law while enforcing a foreign award and observed 
"the above aspect which are illustrative and not 
exhaustive go to show that unless we have a look at the 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or other relevant 
statutes of this country so far as the procedural aspect is 
concerned, it may be difficult, well-nigh impossible to 
proceed further with the application presented under this 
Act for filing the award. It is,therefore, difficult to 
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agree with the submission ... that the Act is such a self-
contained code that we can not have recourse to the Code of 
Civil Procedure or any other statute, while considering the 
procedure to be adopted for enforcing a foreign award under 
this Act" . 
After having gone through Sec A-(l) of the Foreign 
Awards Act and interpreting it with the corresponding 
Article of the New York Convention, his Lordship conclude 
that the procedure for enforcing a foreign award has to be 
the same as followed for enforcing domestic award, subject, 
of course, to this that the provisions of Foreign Awards Act 
of 1961 shall prevail, if there is any inconsistency between 
the provisions of the Act and other Acts which apply to 
domestic award. Even considering this question in the light 
of Private International law, it appears that there cannot 
be any doubt that the Code of Civil Procedure and other 
procedural statutes of this country have to be looked into 
while enforcing a foreign award under the Foreign Awards 
Act, 19&1 
The same approach was also followed by Pendse J. of the 
Bombay High Court in General Electric Co. V/s Renusaqar 
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Power C o . — where his Lordship held that the provision of 
the Code Civil Procedure can be looked into when the Foreign 
Awards Act of 1961 is silent. 
After having a general survey of the cases relating the 
b/ 
procedures Nhich were to be adopted for filing a foreign 
award in India, it may be concluded that the view point of 
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Justice J.P. Desai, of Gujrat High Court and Pendse J. of 
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Bombay High Court that the Foreign Awards Act (which was 
pari materia with the Act of 1937) dealt exclusively with 
enforcement of a foreign award in India could not be taken 
as a self contained code as far as enforcement of a foreign 
award in India was concerned and in the absence of any 
procedural aspect in it, procedural rules embodied in the 
Code of Civil Procedure and other procedural statutes had to 
be looked into while enforcing foreign award in India seems 
a sound principle in Consonance with the legislative history 
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of Article III of the New York Convention , 1958 on which 
the Act were based. It shows that rules of procedure for 
enforcement of a foreign award were determined by the law of 
the country where the enforcement was sought and the rules 
of procedure not concerned with the conditions for 
enforcement were exclusively governed by the Convention 
(such as submission of original copy of the arbitration 
agreements and arbitral award and possibly a translation 
thereof). It allowed application of the law of procedure of 
the forum state to those aspects which were incidental to 
the enforcement but were not regulated by the Convention, ( 
such as discovery of evidences, set off, time limit for 
request of enforcement), provided it did not imply an 
alteration of the conditions for enforcement mentioned in 
bo 
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the Convention. What was prohibited under Article III of 
the Convention, was imposition of more onerous conditions on 
the recognition and enforcement o"f a foreign award than that 
were imposed on the recognition and enforcement of a 
domestic award. However, it is significant to note that 
section 10 of the Act of 1937 and section 11 of the 
43 Foreign Awards Acts , 1961 empowered the High Courts to 
make rules, consistent with the Acts, pertaining to the 
filing of foreign awards and proceedings related thereto; 
the evidence was to be adduced by the party seeking 
enforcement of a foreign award and all proceedings in courts 
under the respective Acts of 1937 and of 1961. Therefore, 
ruled framed by High Court in these aspects, if any, had to 
be looked into before resorting to the relevant provisions 
of the Code of Civil Procedures and other procedural 
statute , Almost similar provisions have been 
incorporated in the arbitration and conciliation ordinance 
1996, presently regulating the enforcement of a foreign 
award m India 
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/a 
Chapter - III 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARD IN INDIA 
The ultimate goal of the parties concerned with 
international commercial arbitration is that when losing 
party fails to carry out the award, the winning party will 
take steps to enforce performance of it without delay. The 
losing party may challenge the 'award' with the hope that it 
will be set aside or at least varied in some way to benefit 
it. A "challenge' is a positive attack on the validity of 
an international award. However, it is appropriate to 
introduce the subject by discussing the question of 
performance of foreign award from a wider view point, so as 
to place "challenge' also in its proper context. 
Generally, the majority of the awards are performed 
voluntarily but sometimes it is necessary to ascertain the 
means by which the award can be enforced in law . A state 
may not be willing to give credit to the award rendered by 
foreign tribunal, or those based on foreign legal procedure. 
The underlying reasons for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards coupled with the theory as to the 
basis of recognition have already been discussed at length 
in the preceding chapter. The ultimate sanction for non 
performance of an award is execution by the court 
proceedings. The mechanism for such court proceedings 
varies from country to country, in respect of enforcement 
of foreign award . 
/d 
The difference is particularly, pertinent in the a.rBa 
of the law applicable (substantive as well as procedural); 
conditions required to be satisfied for its enforcement; of 
grounds of refusal and its challenge; of an award; nature of 
remedies available; method of recognition and enforcement to 
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be adopted . The variances of such a degree in national 
laws obviously led unpredictable results and tempted 
parties' for "forum shopping" in enforcement of foreign 
awards. 
In the light of this background, mentioned above the 
enforcement of foreign awards in India may be considered. 
In the present chapter an attempt has been made to highlight 
the legal lacunae faced in respect of enforcement of a 
foreign award in India under the Arbitration (Protocol and 
Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition 
and Enforcement) Act Act 1961, which have now been repealed 
and re-enacted by the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ordinance, 1996, 
A foreign award in India could be enforced under the 
Multilateral Conventions viz; the Geneva Convention 1927 and 
the New York Convention, 1958 which were given effect by 
India by enacting the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) 
Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and 
Enforcement) Act, 1961 respectively. 
Foreign awards made in the countries which were not 
il 
parties to either of the Conventions were, however, 
enforceable in India on the same grounds and in the same 
circumstances in which they were enforceable under the 
general law on the grounds of justice, equity and good 
conscience. It is however, significant to note that 
same scheme and position in respect of enforcement of 
foreign award in India has, again, been incorporated in the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996, which have 
been discussed in chapter fourth. 
The Foreign Awards Act, 1961 and the Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 were simultaneously 
operative in India. In order to make this study more 
meaningful, it would be convenient to discuss the 
enforcement of foreign awards in India under the Act, 1937 
It 
and the Act of 1961 separately. It is therefore, proposed^^Jo 
I ^^'' ' ^ ""•^  
discuss the topic under the following ^sb^-heads; > 
(i) Enforcement under the Act of 1937, andl ( r--, 10 C? r\ *•• 
(ii) Enforcement under the Act of 1961. 
(A) ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARD UNDER THE ARBITRATION 
(PROTOCOL AND CONVENTION) ACT, 1937 : The mode of 
enforcement of a foreign award was spelt out under Section 6 
of the Act, 1937 . Under this Section the party seeking 
enforcement of a foreign award in India was required to file 
the necessary application along with the required documents, 
6 7 
in accordance with Section 5 read with Section 8 of the 
VA o 
Act. The Court had to be satisfied that the foreign award 
was enforceable under the Act of 1937. If the foreign award 
complied with those conditions the Court had to passed a 
Judgement according to the award against which no appeal 
could be made except in so far as the decree was in excess 
of or was not in conformity with the award. The award was 
made enforceable only through Courts. 
1-CONDITIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN AWARD UNDER THE 
ACT OF 1937 : A Foreign Award in order to be enforceable, 
was required to comply with certain conditions prescribed 
g 
under Section 7 of the Act, 1937 . There were as follows ; 
(a) the award was made in pursuance of an agreement for 
arbitration which was valid under the law by which it 
was governed, (b) the award was made by the tribunal 
provided for in the agreement or constituted in the 
manner agreed upon by the parties. 
<c) the award was made in conformity with the law governing 
the arbitration procedure". 
<d) the award must have become final in the country in 
which it was made 
<e) the award was made have been rendered in respect of a 
matter which may lawfully be referred to arbitration 
under the law of India and the enforcement thereof must 
not be contrary to the public policy or the law of India, 
Each grounds are now discussed in turn. 
(a) The award was made in pursuance of an agreement for 
arbitration which was valid under the law by which it was 
9 
governed : Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section <7) 
simply recognised the principle that an award not related to 
the contract to which arbitration agreement applied was not 
enforceable. It, in effect, excluded the awards from the 
purview of Sec 7(1)(a), where the arbitrators lacked 
jurisdiction through the invalidity of instrument upon which 
their jurisdiction depended or because the award could not 
be connected with a valid agreement to arbitrate. However, 
there existed no indication in the Act of 1937 as to the law 
which was to govern the validity of an agreement to 
arbitrate, as it was made in one country and sought to be 
enforced in another country. Sometimes, the agreement was 
not valid according to the law of the former, but valid 
under the law of the latter. Since the conditions for 
enforcement of a foreign award under the Act of 1937 were 
pari-materia with those prescribed under the Geneva 
Convention of 19S7, a case though not directly related with 
India may also be cited in order to determine the said 
question. Ijl Norske Atlas Insurance Company Ltd. V. London 
General Insurance Co. Ltd. , a policy effected between a 
London Insurance Co. and a Norweigian Insurance Co., 
prescribed that the disputes arising thereunder must be 
arbitrated in Norway. It appeared that the policy was 
ou 
invalid according to English law but valid under the 
Norweigian Law. A dispute arose and an award was made in 
Norway in favour of the plaintiff. In an action brought in 
England to enforce the award, it was contented that the 
policy was unenforceable, as it was void according to 
English law. It was held that the action was brought to 
enforce the award that no action was based on the policy, 
that parties intended the law of Norway to govern their 
contract, and therefore, the invalidity of the policy in 
England did not effect the case. The decision of the Bombay 
High Court jjn. 9e^ Se^ Oi 1 V. Gorakhram Gokulchand was fully 
based on the above referred English case that the applicable 
law in the said matter had to be determined by reference to 
the intention or choice of the parties and in the absence of 
such choice, it was to be determined according to the rules 
of the conflict of the laws of the enforcing state. 
tb) The Award was made by tribunal provided for in the 
agreement or constituted in the manner agreed upon by the 
parties : One of the advantage of the arbitration was that 
the parties had an absolute freedom to select arbitrators 
and constitute the tribunal according to their wishes. Such 
a freedom is totally absent in judicial process. It is 
needless to mention that the essence of arbitration being 
decision by an agreed arbitral body, an award made otherwise 
than by that process can not be enforced. Hence, the Act of 
1937 as well as the Act of 1961, granted absolute freedom to 
6I 
the parties in selection of arbitrators. 
(c> The award was made in conformity with the law governing 
the arbitration procedure : A foreign award to be 
enforceable was required to conform the law governing the 
arbitration procedure in India. The phrase "arbitration 
IS procedure' was a matter of controversy . At one time it 
was not clear whether the arbitrators should follow, only 
the procedure laid down in the arbitration enactment in the 
country in which the arbitration was held or he should also 
observe the principle of natural justice and equity. The 
rule of natural justice is part and parcel of all the legal 
systems. Administration of justice according to law but not 
tempered by equity is a denial of justice and is alien to 
13 
the jurisprudence of any civilized nation . In S_^ Mohammed 
14 Nairn V. Rouraff ic and Far Eastern Ltd. , the Umpire 
interviewed and received information from the parties 
separately and in their absence acted upon such information 
and evidence, while making the award. It was contented 
before Calcutta High Court, that the expression 'arbitration 
procedure ' in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of 
15 
the Protocol Act should be limited only to the procedure 
prescribed by a statutory enactments and no reference should 
be made to the principle of natural justice. The court did 
not accept the contention and accordingly held, that the 
phrase 'the law governing arbitration procedure' is not 
limited to the statutory provisions regulating arbitration 
b^ 
procedure but also entended relevant principles of natural 
justice. The court further held that apart from the law 
which is codified in statutes, principle of equity and 
justice have always guided the court in the matter of 
administration of justice in all civilized country of the 
worId . 
The argument that an award is made in violation of 
principles of natural justice, or in disregard of the 
fundamental of fairplay is a good enforceable award, does 
not merit any serious consideration at all. 
The same issue had again come before the Madras High 
Court in Sovieta Anonmina Lucchasse 01i i E. Vini lucca V. 
Gorakhram Gokal chand , where arbitrator did not give any 
notice to the defendant (Respondent) to represent itself in 
the arbitral proceedings and passed an award against him. 
17 Relying upon Halsbury's laws of England and Russel on 
1Q 
Arbitration the court explained the principle of natural 
justice in the following words : 
There can be no doubt whatever that the arbitrators 
must function together, give notice to the parties and 
opportunities for representation, after they have commenced 
to function together, and that, if they fail to do so, the 
arbitral procedure is void, as not conforming to the 
principle of natural justice. Nothing can be done, as a 
matter of arbitration, to the detriment of a party, ex-
parte, however, much he might have bound himself previausly. 
There cases obviously demonstrate that an award to be 
enforceable in India was required to qualify the arbitration 
procedure stipulated in statutes dealing with arbitration as 
well as the principle of natural justice and equality. 
(d) The award has became final in the country in which it 
was made: The finality of award in the country in which it 
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was made was also enshrined under Section 7(l)(d) of the 
Protocol Act as one of the conditions for enforcement of 
foreign award in India. Further, if any proceedings were 
pending for the purpose of contesting the validity of the 
award in the country in which it was made, it was not 
considered as final and binding. Thus an award could not be 
enforced in India if it was under some judicial proceedings 
initiated to examine the validity thereof. The issue of 
"finality" of award was a matter of controversy between the 
SO 
parties in S£^ SE_ Oi 1 V. Gorakhram Gokulchand , where it was 
contended that unless and until an award was made a 'rule of 
court' and was enforceable as judgement, it was not final 
within the meaning of Section 7(l)(d) of the Act 1937. The 
court rejected the contention and held : 
"An award would be final within the meaning of Sub-
section (d) of the Section 7 (1) of the Act even if it is 
not made a 'rule of court'. What is made enforceable under 
the provisions of the Act is the award and not the decree 
b-t 
making the ward 'a rule of court' .... It appears to me 
that the word 'final' as used in Sub-Clause (d) of Section 
7 (1) was not meant to refer to an award which is made a 
rule of court. The award which was made a rule of court 
would according to laws of a particular country in which it 
21 
was made always be executable as a decree 
(e) The award was made in respect of matter which may 
lawfully be referred to arbitration under the law of India 
and its enforcement should not be contrary to the public 
policy or 'law of India" : An award, in order to be 
enforceable in India was required to be rendered in respect 
of a matter, which was arbitrable under the law of India; 
and whose enforcement should not to be contrary to public 
policy of Ind ia. 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to examine the 
scope of Sec 7 (1) (c) of the Act, 1937 in Nachiappa 
BE Chett iar V. Subramaniuam chettiar . One of the issue for 
determination was whether an arbitral award could determine 
the question, relating to the tittle of immovable property 
situated outside India. It was evident that the courts in 
India or in any country have no jurisdiction to determine 
the question of tittle relating to immovable property 
situated in foreign countries and consequently, direct a 
division thereof . A fortiori courts have no jurisdiction 
to refer such controversies for determination by 
»J 
arbitrators. While upholding the said rule Supreme Court 
held that this rule had no application to the present case, 
as the reference to the arbitration did not include any 
claim with regard to the immovable property situated outside 
India. However, if the reference to arbitration was 
prohibited by any rule of law in force in India, the award 
based on such reference is ab intio void. 
Another question which arose before the Madras High 
Court jjni_ Societa Anonmina Lucchesse 01 i i E. Vini Lucca V. 
Gorakhram Gokulchand , was that whether an award based on a 
reference to arbitration agreement incorporated in a 
contract, which was illegal by, or contrary to, its lex fori 
is enforceable. The fact of the case briefly was that there 
was a contract between an Italian Company and an Indian Firm 
which contained an arbitration clause wherein the 
arbitration was to be held in London according to the rules 
of the London Oi1 and Tallow Trade Association. It was 
"forward contract; which was prohibited in India under 
Vegetable oils and oil cakes (Forward Contract Prohibition) 
order, 19^4. The arbitration was concluded in England, 
where such contract was not prohibited. The award was 
ultimately given in favour of Italian Company. The Italian 
Company thereafter sought its enforcement before the High 
Court of Madras. The enforcement was challenged by Indian 
Firm on three grounds. First, that the contract was illegal 
and void under the Indian Law as it was a 'Forward Contract' 
b6 
violating the vegetable Oils and Oil Cakes (Forward Contract 
Prohibition) order 194^. Secondly, the resultant award 
could not be enforced by virtue of the provision of Section 
25 7(1 ){c) of the Protocol Act, 1937 . Thirdly, the 
arbitration proceedings was not in conformity with the Law 
governing arbitration procedure. On the other hand relying 
upon the rules of conflict of laws, the Italian Company 
Contended that the formal as well as material validity of a 
contract and effect of a foreign arbitral award must be 
governed by the proper law of contract - English or Italian 
law. Hence, the award was enforceable as the contract in 
question was not prohibited in England, where the award was 
passed. 
The court rejected the contention of Italian Company 
and observed : 
"It is very clear as a principle, both of law and 
practice and of private international law, that a court will 
not enforce a contract, which is illegal by its own lex 
fori. If the contract is illegal, the awards will not be 
enforceable either under the Act of 1937 or under general 
principles of law, applicable to the enforceability of the 
contract themselves, or of foreign awards made as a 
consequence of any terms in such contracts. We have doubt 
whatever that, the contract being opposed to the law in this 
country and the clause with regard to reference to 
67 
arbitration being an integral part of the contract, the 
entire subsequent proceedings of arbitration and award would 
also be tainted by the same infirmity". 
The court did not deny the validity of the rule, nor 
did it decline the right of the parties to arbitration to 
lay down the venue of arbitration; and to determine rules 
and regulation to be followed by arbitrators etc. Further 
in case of this nature, the proper law which would be 
applicable to enforcement of arbitral award was the law of 
the place where the contract came into being, but not the 
law of the state in which the arbitration was held. 
In Sh iva Late Bal1inq, Ltd. V. Hind ley and Co. Ltd. 
the Supreme Court considered enforcement of a foreign award 
rendered! pursuant to a contract which was alleged to be 
contrary to the law of India. There was ar> agreement 
between Shiva Jute Balling Ltd., a company incorporated in 
India and Hindley &< Co. Ltd.; a company incorporated in 
England, wherein the arbitration was to be held in London. 
One of the clause in the contract had provided that in the 
event of default of tender or delivery, the seller had to 
pay to the buyer liquidated damages and excess (if any) of 
the market value over the contract, value. When a dispute 
actually, arose between the parties, the English Co. Sought 
recourse to arbitral procedure in England and the Indian 
Company, instead of responding to arbitration, initiated 
' O 
Judicial proceeding in India questioning the validity and 
effect of the arbitral clause. The award was passed in the 
favour of English Company, which in turn filed the award for 
execution under the Protocol Act, 1937 before the Calcutta 
High Court. The prayer was allowed by the Court. In an 
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Indian Company questioned 
the validity of the award, first on the ground that it 
violated the provision of the Section 35 Indian Arbitration 
27 Act, 19A-0 and Secondly, the provision for higher damages, 
amounted to penalty and therefore it was violative of see 74 
28 
of the Indian Contract Act 
The Supreme Court, upholding the first contention held 
that the validity of the arbitration agreement went to the 
very root of the contract, and thereby kept the subject 
matter of arbitration out of the purview of the arbitral 
tribunal. It also held that the award in question had 
violated Sec. 35 of the India Arbitration Act, 1940. 
The ground of public policy for refusal of enforcement 
of a foreign award had always been a subject of ambiguity. 
It was neither defined in the Geneva Convention nor the 
Protocol Act. Some time it is said to be "unruly horse', 
and often it had been called as an 'untrustworthy' guide. 
It allows the enforcing court unfettered freedom to 
interpret and apply it according to its own prudence. 
29 Therefore, in Kamani Engineering , the Bombay High Court 
h\} 
had construed the word 'Shall' under Section 3 of the 1937, 
30 
Act dealing with the mandatory stay of the proceeding in 
respect of the matter to be referred to arbitration, as 
'may' on the ground that it was contrary to public policy to 
oust legal proceedings by agreement of parties. However, 
narrow interpretation was accorded to the arbitration clause 
incorporated in a contract to supply jute to a foreign firm 
by the Calcutta High Court in Pratabmul1 Rameshwar V.K.C. 
31 Sethia . The seller could not export jute without first 
obtaining the quota and licence from the Government. The 
enforcement of a foreign award was challenged on the ground 
that the same was against public policy in India because to 
comply with the agreement and the award would obviously 
mean that the seller was liable to ship the good without 
obtaining a quota and licence in violation of the law of 
India. There was no such conditions for fulfillment of the 
contractual obligations. The arbitrators, admitting the non-
existence of the said condition passed the award in favour 
of the defendant. The court relying upon the terms of 
agreement to arbitrate, which did not require expressly or 
impliedly, performance of the contract subject to quota or 
licence from the Government and consequently, refused to 
stay the enforcement of the award in view of literal rather 
than contextual interpretation. 
It had also been suggested by a court in India that the 
Public Policy ground extends to enforcement of a foreign 
•JO 
award made in pursuance of a contract which is illegal under 
32 its own lex fori . It thus, unequivocally, established 
the principle that no court in India will enforce a contract 
which is illegal by its lex fori. 
(E) CHALLENGE OF AWARD : Generally, the states with 
developed systems of law governing arbitration seek to 
exercise some degree of control over arbitration conducted 
within their country. A 'Challenge' is a positive attack by 
the losing party on the validity of an award. The purpose of 
the challenge is to attack the award with the hope that it 
will be set aside or at least varied in some way to the 
benefit of the party making the challenge. A challenge made 
in a court of competent jurisdiction generally at the place 
in which the arbitration is held. The method of challenging 
the awards differs from country to country, as do the powers 
of the court. The principal grounds and methods of challenge 
had been incorporated under clause (2) of Section 7 of Act 
33 
of 1937 ", wherein the party against whom the award was 
sought to be enforced could have challenged the award on any 
of the following grounds; 
(1) annulment of the award in the country in which it was 
made. 
<2) lack of proper notice of the arbitration to the party 
enabling it to present its case to the party against 
^1 
whom it %'i3.B sought to be enforced or was under some 
legal incapacity and was not property represented. (3) 
When the award did not deal with all the questions 
referred or contained decisions on the matter beyond 
the scope of agreement for arbitration. 
It is amply clear from the phraseology of the Section 
7(E) of the Act dealing with the grounds of objection that 
the ground of objection had to be determined by reference to 
the law governing the arbitration. Whether a party was 
property represented or was under some legal incapacity 
seems to be a question of fact, which had also to be 
determined by the law governing arbitration. Under the third 
ground, the enforcing court was solely concerned with the 
issue whether all the matters which were referred to the 
arbitrators have been dealt with in the awards. If not, the 
court could either postpone the enforcement until the 
matters were subjected to a further award or permit 
enforcement, where the terms of award were unlikely to be 
affected by any subsequent supplementary award. There hardly 
existed any judicial pronouncement on the topic under 
review. 
The conditions required for the enforcement of a 
foreign award under Act of 1937 were to be proved by the 
party seeking its enforcement but the objections for 
challenging the award under the Act were to be proved by the 
recalcitrant party. 
(B) ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS UNDER THE FOREIGN AWARDS 
ACT, 1961: As far as enforcement of foreign arbitral award 
is concerned, the Act of 1937 and of 1961, were modeled on 
the same line. However, there was a fundamental difference 
between them. The Act of 1937, imposed on the party seeking 
enforcement of a foreign award, a duty to establish the 
validity and finality of the award in the country of its 
34 
origin , While the Act of 1961 enjoined upon the defendant 
to prove that the award was not enforceable for want of the 
35 
conditions required to be fulfilled under the Act . In 
other words, the 1961 Act, presumed that an award filed in 
accordance with the formalities, required under Section 5 of 
36 the Act 1961 was valid until contrary was proved. The 
burden was not only shifted to the contesting party, under 
the Act of 1961, but also was reduced to some extent. The 
practical strength of the Act of 1961 which was based on New 
York Convention, 1958 provided wholly revised scheme of 
conditions required for enforcement of foreign award in 
India. Nevertheless it had not attempted to make any 
alteration or modification in the principle, which was 
37 fundamental to the Act of 1937. However, the amplitude of 
the power of the scrutiny of the courts available to them 
under the Act of 1937, was minimised under the Act 1961. 
For example the obstacles faced by the petitioner seeking 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the Act of 
1937 had greatly been removed both by reducing the grounds 
B3 
for refusal of the awards and by redistributing the burden 
38 
of proof as to their existence . The provisions of section 
39 
7 of the Foreign Award Act, 1961 did amply indicate that 
if a petition for enforcement of a foreign award, 
accompanied by original award or its duly authenticated 
copy, original arbitration agreement or its certified copy 
and necessary evidence providing that the award was a 
foreign award under the Act was filed and when the enforcing 
court was satisfied that the award was enforceable under the 
Foreign Awards Act 1961, the court ordered the award to be 
enforced. However, a petition for enforcement could be 
dismissed only on one of the seven different grounds 
prescribed as follows ; 
a) Lack of capacity of the parties to conclude an 
agreement or lack of a valid arbitration agreement. 
b) Where the aggrieved party was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrators or of arbitration 
proceedings or otherwise unable to present his case. 
c) Where the award dealt with matters not covered by the 
arbitration clause or agreement to arbitrate, thereby 
rendering the arbitral tribunal incompetent for lack of 
jur isd ict ion; 
d) Where the composition of arbitral tribunal or arbitral 
proceeding was not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties, 
e) Suspension or annulment of the award or its failure to 
become binding in the country of its origin. 
f> Non-arbitrabi1ity of subject matter of the dispute in 
India, and 
g) Where the award was in conflict with the public policy 
of India 
One could easily have drawn the inference from the 
A-1 provision of Section 7 of the Act that application for 
setting aside the award was intended to be the sole 
opportunity for recourse against the award in the state 
where the arbitration took place. Since Section 7 was in 
essence taken from New York Convention 1958, so the cases 
arising out of the dispute between the signatories to the 
said Convention in respect of recourse against the foreign 
award may be cited. However, it is significant to note that 
the same grounds of refusal are set out in the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Ordinance 1996, which have been discussed 
in the fourth chapter. 
Eachj^^grounds are now discussed in detail hereunder. 
(a) Incapacity of the Parties or Invalidity of the 
Arbitration Agreement : To succeed on this ground, it was to 
be shown by the party that : 
"The parties to the arbitration agreement were, under 
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the 
said agreement was not valid under the law to which the 
parties had subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made". 
Thus section 7(i) (a) provided sufficient indication that 
incapacity of any parties was enough to bring the provision 
in motion. It had to be determined by the law applicable to 
the parties including rules of the conflict of laws of the 
state where the enforcement was sought. The law to be 
applied for determination of validity of an agreement to 
arbitrate, however, was that to which the parties had 
subjected the agreement or failing any indication thereon, 
the law of the country where the award was made. No 
judicial pronouncement came into light on the said ground of 
refusal in India. 
(b) Denial of fair hearing : To succeed on this ground, the 
party against whom the award was invoked was required to 
show that he was not given proper notice of the appointment 
of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceeding or was 
otherwise unable to present its case. 
The principle of due process or rules of natural 
justice in arbitral proceeding was given due place in the 
Act of 1961 under Sec. 7 (i) (a) (ii) . It was intended 
that a party to an arbitration agreement must be given a 
fair opportunity to present its case as well as to know the 
cs-se of its opponent. Thus, it prevented the enforcement of 
bb 
foreign awards in violation of the principles of due 
process. 
But the Act of 1961, like New York Convention did not 
speak about the law to be applied to determine the question 
relating to 'Standard of Proper Notice' and of inability of 
a party to present its case. However, it had been argued 
that it was deliberately omitted with a view to give wider 
discretion to enforcing court to apply international 
standard in deciding the issues on factual circumstances 
Thus, the violation of rules of natural justice in 
accordance with the Indian Standard need not necessarily 
constitute a violation of due process in the case of a 
foreign award. 
The equality of opportunity to be heard connotes that a 
party must have been effectively offered the opportunity to 
present its cases. It did not embrace the situation when a 
party after having been duly informed, refused to 
participate in the arbitration. He was considered to have 
forfeited the opportunity. The Bombay High Court in European 
45 Grain &. Sh ippinq Ltd. V/s. Seth Oil Mills Ltd. , wherein 
the plea for non-enforcement, Inter alia, was that the 
notice did not set out the claim, held that he was 
conscious of the claim for damages and due notice of 
appointment of arbitrators and arbitration proceedings had 
been given and challenge of violation of a section 7(i) (a) 
h6 (ii) of the Act, 1961 was without any substance. 
Similarly the High Court of Delhi in Ludwiq Ulunsche and Co. 
Y. Raunaq International Ltd. , where the Raunaq 
International Ltd., inspite of notice of arbitration 
deliberately abstained from participating in arbitration 
proceedings in London to keep itself engaged in certain 
connected litigation India, refused to deny enforcement of 
foreign award, inter alia, on the ground that such an 
enforcement would not be violative the principle embodied 
under section 7(i)(a)(ii) of the Act of 1961. 
(C) Violation by Award of the scope of agreement to 
arbitrate : Clause (a)(iii) of Section 7(i) of the Foreign 
Award Act 1961,corresponding to Clause (C) of Article (V) of 
the New York Convention 1958 required the party against whom 
the award was invoked, to show that: 
"The award deals with difference not contemplated by or 
not falling within the terms of agreement to arbitration, or 
it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
agreement to arbitration, provided that if the decision on 
matters submitted to arbitration could be separated from 
those not so submitted, that part of the award could be 
recognised and enforced." An Italian court's decision may 
be cited as to how this works. An Italian Judge while 
deciding on the enforcement of a foreign award, can not 
examine the merits of the award of the arbitral tribunal. 
ys 
However, he can eKamine the award to determine, whether the 
arbitral tribunal has exceeded the limits of its 
jurisdiction. Having carried out such an examination of the 
award, the Italian court separated the matters held to be 
outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and 
granted partial enforcement of the award to the extent that 
it dealt with the matter within the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal 
A common example of a provision for an award to be set 
aside for lack of jurisdiction is found in French law 
governing international arbitrations wherein an 
international award may be set aside, if it is made in the 
absence of an arbitration agreement, or on the basis of void 
or expired agreement 
(d) Procedural Irregularities or Improper Composition : To 
succeed on this ground, the party against whom the award was 
invoked was required under Section 7(i)(a)(iv) of 1961 Act, 
to show that the award was rendered by improperly 
constituted arbitral authority or a property constituted 
arbitral authority but while passing the award the arbitral 
procedure mentioned in the arbitration agreement had not 
been followed or in its absence, the arbitral procedure of 
the country where the arbitration took place had not been 
followed. 
One could easily has drawn the inference from the said 
iJS 
section that it recognised autonomy to the parties to 
arbitration in opting for any procedural rules but at the 
same time there existed no indication as to the amplitude of 
this autonomy. 'The travaux preparatoires and phraseology 
of the provision made it clear that the said section was 
intended to grant complete autonomy to opt any arbitral 
procedure even completely independent of national Laws. 
(^ ) Suspension or annulment of the award or its 
failure to became binding on tHE parties in the country 
where it was made : Under Section 7 (1) (a) (v) of the 
Foreign Awards Act, 1961, the party against whom the award 
was invoked was required to show that the award had not yet 
become binding on the parties, or had been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country of its 
origin. The problem of double exequatur, a product of the 
Act of 1937, wherein under which a leave for enforcement of 
art award was required from the country of its origin as well 
as from the country of its enforcement was eliminated by the 
said Section. The word 'final' appearing in the 
corresponding Section of 1937, Act, was replaced by the word 
'binding' which, consequently, avoided any reference to the 
'finality' of the award. Mention may also be made of 
50 Section ^ of the 1961 , Act which also treated the foreign 
award, enforceable under the Act of 1961, as 'binding' for 
all purposes on the persons as between whom it was made. 
But the Act of 1961, failed to provide any guide line for 
lOu 
the determination of the binding character of a foreign 
award and the moment at which it would become binding. 
Neither the Act of 1961 nor the New York Convention on which 
the Foreign Award Act was based defined the key term 
b m d m g 
However Supreme Court of India had an opportunity to 
define the term 'binding' and its content in Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission V. Western Company of North 
America ,, wherein it was argued that an award should be 
treated as binding only when it has become enforceable in 
the country of its origin. The court, relying upon the 
legislative history of Article (V)(i)(e) of the New York 
Convention, held that term "binding" differs from "finality" 
of a foreign award. The court came out with the view that 
the first question as to whether the award has become 
binding on the parties or has yet not become binding on the 
parties has to be determined in the context of the law of 
the country governing the arbitration proceedings or the 
53 
country under the law of which the award was made. The 
apex Court, quoting with approval observations of Albert Jan 
Van Den Berg from his treaties entitled the New York 
Arbitration Convention of 1958-Toward a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation had also opined that the question at which 
moment an award becomes binding within the meaning of 
Article (V)(l)(e) of the New York convention has also to be 
iU 
5*^  determined by the law applicable to the award 
The question as to whether a foreign award was binding 
on the parties in the country of its origin or it was 
required to be final under the law of that country before it 
could be enforced under the Foreign Awards Act of 1961, had 
come up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in a 
recent case General Electr ic Co. of Amer ica V/s Renusaqar 
Power C o • — It was argued by Renu sagar that Foreign Award 
to be enforceable in India under the Foreign Awards Act of 
1961 must be binding and final. Renu Sagar, relying upon 
Section 7(l)(a)(v) of the Act and Rule 801 (c)(4) of the 
Rules framed by the Bombay High Court under Section 11 of 
56 the 1961 Act, contented that an award, which had yet not 
become final and binding on the parties under the law of 
France where it was made, was not enforceable. Pendse J., 
after having surveyed the legislative changes brought in the 
Foreign Awards Act in pursuance of the New York Convention, 
refused to accept the contention of Renu Sagar and observed: 
"the submission that award should be final before 
enforcement is clearly erroneous and so also reliance on 
Rule 801. This court had framed Rules under the Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937. It is unfortunate that 
after the enactment of 1961 Act, the Rules framed in 1937 
Act were bodily lifted while framing Rules under the new 
Act. The Rule 801(c)(4) framed under the 1961 Act overlooks 
10, 
the legislative changes and the cogent reasons for deletiny 
the expression "final' and substituting the expression 
'binding'. Power to frame rules under Section 11 of the 
19(t)l Act can be exercised consistent with the provisions of 
the Act and these Rules can not affect or override the 
substantive Law prescribed by the legislation. In these 
circumstances it is futile to suggest that merely because of 
an error committed while adopting Rules under the 1961 Act, 
the legislative fiat should be ignored and General Electric 
Co. should establish that the award is not only binding but 
57 has become final in France." 
Thus legislative changes brought in the New York 
Convention were intended to eliminate the so-called double 
exequatur (leave for enforcement) requirement prevalent in 
the Geneva Convention on which the Act of 1937 was based. 
The view point of Pendse J. undoubtedly seems sound in this 
regard. 
Another significant aspect of Section 7(l)(a)(v) came 
up for consideration before Delhi High Court in C.D.S.I.D. 
58 Inc. and another V/S Steel Authority of India , Where the 
court was inter alia, called upon to determine the binding 
nature of a foreign award exhibiting an error of law 
apparent on face of it as no specific questions of law or of 
fact had been referred to the arbitrator. The court held 
that an award can not be said binding on the parties if no 
.iu3 
specific question of law or of fact are reffc?r red tu tht? 
59 
arbi trat ion". 
(f) Non arbitrability of the subject matter of dispute: 
Recognition and enforcement of an award could also be 
refused under Section 7(l)(b)(i) of the 1961 Act on the 
ground of non-arbitrabi1ity of the subject matter of 
dispute. To succeed on this ground it was required to be 
shown by the party against whom the award was sought to be 
enforced that the subject matter of difference was not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of India. 
By virtue of the said section the courts were empowered to 
refuse the award to be enforced, on its own motion, if it 
satisfied that the subject matter of dispute was not capable 
of settlement by arbitration under the law of India. The 
idea behind the inclusion of the said ground perhaps was to 
recognise the very fundamental principle of arbitral process 
that a court should be precluded to enforce an award 
relating to a matter that could not have been dealt with by 
arbitration in its jurisdiction. However, in absence of any 
reported decision in India on the said ground, it was 
difficult to comprehend the judicial approach on denial of 
enforcement of foreign award on non-arbitrabi1ity of subject 
matter of arbitration. 
(g) Violation of Public Policy : Violation of public policy 
was treated as one of grounds on which an award could be 
l u % 
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refused under Section 7()(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards 
Act, 1961, which was in essence taken from corresponding 
Article V(2) (6) of the New York Convention. It, in general 
furnished a ground for refusal of an award if its 
enforcement was likely to offend fundamental moral 
conviction or policies of law of India. However, a mere 
contravention of law was not treated as a bar of public 
policy, but the award was required to be contrary to (1) 
fundamental policy of Indian law or (ii) the interest of 
India or (iii) justice or mortality 
The same approach was also followed in an English case, 
Parson and Wh ittermore Overseas Co. Inc.. V/s Srciete 
63 Generale de I' Industr ie du Papier (RAKTA) , where the 
District Court for the District of New York was confronted 
by an agreement that recognition and enforcement of an award 
should be refused on the ground that the diplomatic 
relations between Egypt (the defendants' state) and United 
States had been severed. The court rejected the argument 
and referring to "'the general 'pro-enforcement bias' of the 
New York Convention held that the Convention's public 
policy defence should be construed narrowly; and that 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards should only be denied 
on this basis, "where enforcement would violate the ferum's 
states most basic notions of morality and Justice". 
However, contents of the term 'public policy' or of its 
facets, the so called fundamental moral Conviction or 
l u , 
policies, were not only devoid of precise formulations but 
also flexible and uncertain. The Supreme of India rightly 
opined in Gharulal Parekh V/s Mahadeodas Maiya and Others 
that "the public policy which has been described as 
'untrustworthy guide', or 'unruly horse', is an illusive 
concept. It is a vague and unsatisfactory term. It is 
capable of being perceived in different senses according to 
education, habits, talents and dispositions of each person, 
who is to decide whether an act is against public policy or 
not" . 
However, the apex court had tendered an advice to 
courts in India to invoke the public policy ground only in 
clear and indisputable cases of harm to the public and not 
to make any attempt to discover new heads of public policy. 
The court in India while exercising the power under the 
said Section of the Act of 1961 could hardly venture a 
detailed inquiry as to whether the award was contrary to the 
laws of India or to laws of the country in which it was 
made. The power of the court under the Act of 1961 was 
restricted to the question as to whether the enforcement of 
such an award would be contrary to the public policy of 
T A - 4-67 
India or not 
The Delhi High Court in C.O.S.I.D. Inc. V/s Steel 
68 
Authority of India was inter alia, called upon to consider 
the extent of powers of an enforcing court under 
l u G 
Section (l)(b)(ii) of the 1961 Act to go into merits of an 
award and propriety to undertake a detailed inquiry as to 
whether the award was contrary to the laws of India or to 
the laws of the country in which it was made. 
Relying upon the pro-enforcement bias of the New York 
Convention on which the Foreign Awards Act of 1961 was 
based, and increasing acceptance in different countries of 
distinction between 'international public policy' and 
'domestic public policy' it was argued that the term 'public 
policy' should be construed narrowly. It was also contended 
the court's power to go into the merits of an award would 
upset the finding of arbitrators. 
However, D.P. Wadhwa J. refused to accept both the 
contentions and opined that the opinion of the arbitrators 
that letter issued by Under-Secretary to the Government of 
India intimating the Steel Authority of India Ltd., (SAIL), 
a Govt. Co. Solely owned by the Govt, of India, ban on 
export, shipment of HR Coils with immediate effect, which 
was relied upon by the SAIL to repudiate the shipment of HR 
Coils to COISD; was without force of law and was not legal. 
And therefor, it was contrary to public policy of India to 
enforce the arbitral award which was based on wrong 
interpretation of legal effect of the letter prohibiting 
export of HR Coils, and thereby showing an error apparent on 
69 
the face of it . Similarly, his Lordship was not impressed 
l u 
by the argument that the e.KpresBian publit policy be 
interpreted in tune with overseas judicial approach and in 
consonance with legislative history of the corresponding 
Article of the New York Convention to embrace international 
public policy as distinct from domestic public policy. The 
court accordingly held that the 'expression' public policy 
in Section 7(l)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act of 1961 
70 
meant 'public policy of India'. 
71 
But the approach adopted by D.P. Wadhwa in COSID Inc. 
was not fallowed by Pendse J. of Bombay High Court in 
72 General Electr ic Co. His Lordship came out with a view 
that "the validity of award is not required to be 
determined, but the only question to be examined is whether 
the enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of the country where the award is sought to be 
enforced. The enforcing court should not enter upon a 
detailed inquiry as to whether the award is contrary to the 
laws of this country or to the laws of the country of its 
origin. The narrow ambit of inquiry is whether the 
enforcement of such award would be contrary to the public 
73 policy of the court of enforcement" . Pendse J. also 
opined that an enforcing court should be extremely cautious 
that the party against whom the enforcement was sought did 
not invite the court to enter into the merits of the award 
by claiming that the enforcement was contrary to public 
policy and that the court should be guided by what had been 
iu, 
accepted as limitation in determining whether the 
enforcement was contrary to public policy by courts of 
various countries, by limiting the inquiry only to those 
violations of public policy which were recognised by 
73 international community 
Referring to observation of Uladhwa J. of the Delhi High 
Court and justifying his refusal to read the distinction 
between 'international public policy' and 'domestic public 
policy' in C.0.I•D. Inc•. Pendse J. observed: 
"I am afraid I am unable to share the view taken by 
learned judge. In my judgement, it is necessary to bear in 
mind the distinction between domestic and international 
public policy as has been done by courts of various 
countries while examining the question as to whether a 
foreign award is contrary public policy. The view taken by 
the courts of various countries on this respect after 
enactment of the New York Convention is healthy and would 
advance the cause for which the New York Convention was 
adopted and would certainly assist in international trade 
and commerce arbitration. The court should be anxious in 
not defeating the foreign awards by finding out some defect 
here and there and then equating it with public policy of 
the country in which the award is sought to be enforced. 
The enforcement should not be denied on a spacious ground 
that the enforcement is contrary to public policy because 
iUj 
the award is not acceptable to the party against wham 
enforcement is sought". 
On account of pro-enforcement bias of the New York 
Convention coupled with increasing acceptance of the 
distinction between domestic and international public policy 
in a large number of court decisions reported under the New 
York Convention and the legislative history of Section 
7(l)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 and 
corresponding provisions of 1937 Act and the Geneva 
Convention, it is submitted that the interpretation offered 
by Pendse J. seems more appropriate, convincing and 
compatible with the judicial approach to the expression 
75 public policy abroad 
In view of the aforesaid discussion we may conclude 
that thee growing intensity of modern international trade 
and resort to arbitration as a forum of settlement of 
international commercial disputes have exposed several in-
built weaknesses and consequential practical impediments of 
the Act of 1937 and of 1961 in the enforcement of a foreign 
award in India. 
The Act of 1937 placed on the party seeking enforcement 
of foreign award heavy burden of proving the conditions 
necessary for such enforcement. One of the complex 
condition was that he had to produce documentary evidence 
showing the finality of the award in the country of its 
iiU 
origin as ell as in the country where its enforcement was 
sought. Thus, in practice this requirement of finality of 
an award resulted in the problem of so called double 
exequatur (Leave for enforcement). Under the Act of 
1937, there existed no indication as to law determining the 
validity of an arbitration agreement, as it was made in one 
country and sought to be enforced in another country. The 
party seeking enforcement of a foreign award was required to 
prove the validity of arbitration agreement in both the said 
countr ies. 
The Act of 1937 stipulated the requirement of arbitral 
procedure to be govern by lax loci arbitri. The phrase 
'arbitration procedure' was a matter of controversy as to 
whether the arbitrators should follow only the procedure 
laid down in the arbitration enactments in the country where 
the arbitration was held or he should also observed 
principle of natural justice and equity. 
The Act of 1961 provided wholly revised scheme of 
conditions required for enforcement of a foreign award in 
India. It shifted the heavy burden of proving the said 
conditions on the shoulder of contesting party. It also 
minimised the power of scrutiny of the courts available to 
them under the Act of 1937. Nevertheless, the Act of 1961 
was also proned with certain practical impediment in respect 
of enforcement of a foreign award in India. 
Refusal for enforcement of a foreign award on the 
li 
ground that it has not become binding on the parties led to 
a great confusion on account of lack of any guide line for 
determining its binding character and the moment at which it 
would become binding. 
Denial of fair hearing also constituted one of the 
grounds of refusal of foreign awards, wherein the concerning 
party could pleaded that he was not given a proper notice of 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration 
proceeding. The Act of 1961 did not speak about the law to 
be applied for determining the question relating to standard 
of proper notice. 
Owing to the diversity and complexity of national laws 
and the rules of the conflict of laws, it was not easy for 
the party seeking enforcement of a foreign award under the 
said Acts to prove the compatibility of the arbitral 
procedure followed by the tribunal of a country where the 
award was made with the principle of the law of the country 
where the award was sought to be enforced. This condition 
was in fact provided an opportunity to the reluctant party 
to attack on an award that it offended the law of the 'forum 
state', which consequently delayed the enforcement 
proceedings for years altogether. There were grave 
uncertainties as to work constitutes the public policy of 
India on account of its expanded horizon, the concept the 
public policy under both the Acts has not been free 
vagueness and subjected to varied interpretation. 
lU 
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CHAPTER - IV 
STAY OF CONCURRENT PROCEEDING 
Most of the countries of the world keep the door of 
their Courts of justice wide open to all the Sundry 
litigants. This implies that the parties to foreign 
agreements are not only free to chose any country as a 
'forum' for their actions but they can also pursue their 
remedy in more than one jurisdiction. In our contemporary 
world, with easy means of communication and intercourse 
coupled with very wide and open jurisdiction rules, it has 
become possible for the parties to foreign agreements to 
file legal proceedings on the same subject matters and 
between the same parties, in more than one jurisdictions. 
Generally, in international trade, an agreement to 
arbitration is concluded in one country and its resultant 
award is sought to be enforced in another country. 
Arbitral clauses in such an agreement could be rendered 
inoperative by filing a suit in municipal courts by one of 
the parties to the agreements and thus, preventing 
arbitrators to arbitrate. Such method of abuse of judicial 
process could be prevented by stay of local action. Recourse 
to this remedy could be availed when concurrent measures 
were pursued by the parties in respect of the same cause of 
actions, one at national level and another in foreign land 
where the arbitral tribunal was situated. 
id 
To discourage this vexatious practice adopted by 
parties to foreign arbitral agreements in contravention of 
the procedure laid down therein, courts were empowered to 
grant stay of local action under national enactments and 
specifically, under the Protocol legislations which 
incorporated the provisions of international conventions as 
regard to arbitration. The court's power to grant stay of 
such action originates in the general principle that " the 
court makes people abide by their contracts and therefor, 
will restrain plaintiff from bringing an action in breach of 
this agreement with the defendant" 
This power of stay of local action was both discre-
tionary and obligatory. It was discretionary under municipal 
statute,while it was obligatory under the Protocol enactments 
viz. the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 and 
the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. 
In India a stay of local action in the above 
described situations, hitherto could be taken under the 
then exiting three enactments. Viz, the Arbitration 
Act 19A-0, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) 
Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and 
Enforcement) Act, 1961. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940 
the courts power of stay of local action was 
discretionary while under the Act of 1937 and of 1961 it was 
obligatory. The present chapter is intended to deal with the 
stay of concurrent proceeding under the said enactments and 
1^8 
highlight the restraint caused by it in enforcing the 
foreign arbitral award in India .In order to formulate the 
problems caused by stay of legal proceedings more clearly 
and categorically, it may be useful to discuss the court's 
mandatory and obligatory powers to stay of concurrent 
proceedings separately. 
(A) DISCRETIONARY POWER : As we have already pointed out 
that the power of the court to stay Local action was 
discretionary under the arbitration Act of 19A-0. Section 3^ 
of the Act dealt with the discretionary power of the court 
to grant stay . 
Since the court's power under Section 3^ of the 
Arbitration Act, 19^0 was of discretionary nature a party 
could not claim stay of the legal proceeding as a matter of 
3 
right . The discretion, however, had to be exercised 
judiciously. In Anderson Wright, Ltd. V/s Moran and Co.~, 
the Supreme Court came out with a view that in order to 
grant stay under Section 3^ of the Arbitrator Act, 19^0 , 
the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
(1) the proceeding must have been commenced by a 
party to an arbitration agreement against other party; 
(S) the legal proceeding which is sought to be stayed 
must be in respect of matter agreed to be referred. 
(3) the applicant for stay must be a party to legal 
1^2 
proceeding and he must have taken no step in the 
proceeding after appearance. It is also necessary that 
he should satisfy the court not only that he is but 
also was at the commencement of the proceeding ready 
and wiling to do everything necessary for the proper 
conduct of the arbitration. 
(.^) The court must be satisfied that there is no 
sufficient reason that why the matter should not be 
referred to arbitration in accordance with the 
arbitration agreement. 
The issue relating to the applicability of Section 34 
of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to an agreement concerning 
foreign arbitration came for determination before Calcutta 
7 
High court in Michel V. Serajuddin , where the court 
concluded that there is no limitation in the language of 
Section 34 to support the contention that Section 34 does 
not apply to an agreement contemplating foreign 
8 9 
arbitration . On appeal the Supreme Court proceeded on 
assumption of the applicability of Section 34 to foreign 
agreement and held that the provision of Section 34 applies, 
even when there is no covenant to refer a matter to 
foreign arbitration tribunal. Enunciating the principle shah 
J. observed that; 
"Where a party to an arbitration agreement 
commenced an action for determination of a matter agreed to 
be referred under an arbitration agreement, the court 
normally favours stay of action leaving the plaintiff to 
resort to the tribunal chosen by the parties for the 
adjudication. The court in such a case is unwilling to 
countenance, unless there is a sufficient reason, breach of 
solemn obligation to seek resort to the tribunal selected by 
him, if other party thereof still remains ready and willing 
to do all the things necessary for the proper conduct of the 
arbitration. The rule applies to arbitration by tribunal, 
foreign as well as domestic." 
The court was therefore, not obliged to grant stay 
merely because the parties had, even under commercial 
contract agreed to refer their disputes to an arbitral 
tr ibunal. 
In Runqta &< Sons Pvt. Ltd. V/s Juqo Metal Trq. 
11 Republic , the stay was granted on the facts where in a 
contract between Indian Co. and a Yugoslavian Co., the 
parties agreed to refer their dispute arising under the said 
contract to arbitration to a Zurich tribunal. The argument 
of. the plaintiff was rejected by the court that it would be 
difficult for him to produce evidence at Zurich. The court 
said that there is no reason why the necessary action can 
not be taken at Zurich, The mere fact that parties would 
have to incur large costs in arbitration held at Zurich in 
not sufficient reason for not staying to proceeding filed in 
Indi a. 
idi 
IE Following the Anderson Ulriqht's case , the Supreme 
Court of India again reiterated the same view in Rachppa 
13 Guruadappa Bijapur V/s Gurusidappa Nuraniaooa and other 
Where a partnership firm was constituted in 197S to run a 
cinema theatre. The said firm was reconstituted in 1973 for 
a period of 25 years with one partner retiring from the 
first firm. In the said reconstituted firm, one partner had 
a share of IE */.. In 1980 on of the Respondents issued a 
notice calling for dissolution of the firm alleging 
mismanagement, loss and exclusion from management. In 1981 
the Respondent filed a suit in the court of civil Judge, 
Hub 1i, for (1) dissolution of the firm and (ii) the account. 
One 4th November 1981, defendant No.7 in the said firm filed 
an application under Section 3^ of Indian Arbitration Act, 
1940 for the stay of the suit. 
The learned trial Judges after referring to the fact 
and other relevant decisions referred to the order sheet in 
this matter, and observed that there was a clear record in 
order sheet that the Lawyer of the applicant had "sought 
adjournment, specifically, for filing written statement". 
In view of this, the learned Judge expressed the view that 
since petitioner had taken step in the proceeding in the 
suit, he declined to exercise his jurisdiction to stay the 
said suit under Section 34 of the Act of 1940. The High 
court therefore, did conformed the view expressed by learned 
trial. Judge, Aggrieved petitioner sought leave to appeal 
U2 
against the said decision. The Supreme Court again conformed 
the fulfillment of the conditions laid down by it in 
Anderson Uriqht in order to have a legal proceeding in the 
suit stayed. 
The supreme court re-affirmed the discretionary power 
of the the court in granting or refusing stay under Section 
3^ of Indian Arbitration Act 19^0 in Ramji Dyawala &< Sons 
(P.) Ltd. V. Invest Import , where the plaintiff (appellant 
herein) was a labour contractor, a private Ltd. Company 
filed a suit in the year 1963 to recover Rs. 4,25,343-00 
from a giant Foreign Engineering and Construction Company 
which had undertaken to erect a Thermal Power Station at 
Barauni in Bihar. The suit stand stayed. Plaintiff 
(appellant herein) entered into a sub-contact for erecting 
two complete radiation type Steam Boilers as a part of 
Thermal Power Station at Barauni with the defendant Invest-
Import, a Yugoslavian Company which had in turn entered into 
a contract with Bihar State Electricity Board for setting 
Power Station. The Plaintiff pursuant to sub-contractor, had 
to supply skilled and aperenticed Labours, to carry out the 
erection work and to do other things provided in the sub-
contract. The contract also provided for employing extra 
labour force as well for carrying out extra stipulated 
job for installation. In carrying out the works undertaken 
under sub-contract, the plaintiff claimed that it carried 
out some extra work and entitled remuneration for the same. 
160 
On a notice of motion taken out by the Appellant, a learned 
single judge of High Court granted an ad interim ex-parte 
injunction, restraining the Respondent from withdrawing the 
money, due to it, from Bihar State Electricity Board. 
Pursuant to service of notice of motion. Respondent 
company moved an application purporting to be under Section 
17 151 of Code of Civil Procedure , contended, inter alia, 
that sub-contract between Appellant and Respondent 
incorporates an agreement to refer all their disputes 
arising out of sub-contract to arbitration and therefore, 
the suit should be stayed. The clause spelling out 
arbitration was reproduced. It was also averred that if the 
provision of Arbitration Act, 1940 does not apply, the court 
should in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, restrain 
the plaintiff Appellant from proceeding with the suit 
instituted by it. It was further prayed that interim 
injunction granted by High Court be vacated. 
The Appellant filed counter-affidavit Controverting 
the contention made by Respondent in the petition seeking 
stay of the suit. The central contention, inter alia, was 
that there existed no concluded arbitration agreement 
between the parties to refer their disputes to the 
arbitration, therefore, suit cannot be stayed. 
Alternatively, even if the court comes to the conclusion 
that there is such a subsisting agreement between the 
id't 
parties, prayer for stay having been made under Section 3U 
1S 
of the Arbitration Act, 19A-0 , read with 151 of the Code of 
19 Civil Procedure, 1908, the court should not enforce it in 
its discretionary jurisdiction, in the fact and 
circumstances of the case, as it would result in miscarriage 
of justice. 
Having examined the matter from every angles the 
Supreme Court Said that both the learned single judge and 
the Division Bench of High Court were in error in granting 
stay of suit in this matter, therefore, appeal allowed and 
stay of suit granted by learned single judge and the stay 
affirmed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court stands 
vacated. Delivering the judgment ,learned J Desai, 
observed, that if the application for stay filed by 
Respondent purported to be under Section 3*^  of the 
EO Arbitration Act, 1940 , by a series of decisions it is well 
settled that the granting of stay of suit is within the 
discretion of the court. The expression "such authority may 
make an order staying the proceedings" under Section 34 of 
the Act of 1940 clearly indicates that the court has 
discretion whether to grant stay and thereby compel the 
parties to abide by the contract or the court may refuse to 
lend its assistance by undertaking to adjudicate the 
disputes and refuse the stay. If the application is made 
under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, undoubtedly, 
the court still would have discretion in exercise of its 
Iciu 
inherent Jurisdiction to grant stay of the suit or refuse 
the same but the approach of the court would be different. 
If Section 3^ of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is attracted, 
ordinarily, the approach of the court would be to see that 
people are held to their bargain. Therefore, the party who 
is in breach of arbitration agreement, institutes an action 
before the court, the burden would be on such party to 
prove, that why the stay should be refused. On the other 
hand, if the application is under Section 151. of the Code 
of Civil Procedure , invoking inherent jurisdiction to grant 
stay, the burden will be on the party seeking stay to 
establish facts for exercise of discretion in favour of such 
party. In the present case Respondent, who moved an 
application for stay of suit instituted by the applicant 
founded its request for stated on shifting stands, in which 
at one stage it was stated that the application was under 
Section 34, of Arbitration Act 194, at other stage it was 
stated that it was under Section 151 of Code of Civil 
Procedure and before us it was stated that it is under 
Section 3 of the Arbitration (Protocol & Convention) Act 
21 1937 or Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition &< 
E2 Enforcement) Act 1961, . In the notice of motion taking out 
for stay of the suit by Respondent, it was stated that the 
application purported to be under Section 151, of the code 
of Civil Procedure, 190S. There is no reference of Section 
34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 in the body of petition. The 
136 
court may in enercise of its inherent jurisdiction restrain 
the appellant from proceeding with the suit. Learned single 
judge appeared to have taken the application under Section 
34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, because in the last 
paragraph of his order he has stated that the Arbitration 
Act applies even if arbitration agreement provided for 
reference to foreign arbitral tribunal. While dealing with 
the contention that Section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 
would not attracted because arbitration agreement refer to 
arbitration by foreign tribunal, the court held that even if 
Section 34 is not attracted, the court can in exercise of 
its inherent jurisdiction for doing justice between the 
parties stay further proceeding of the suit which would 
imply that the court exercised its jurisdiction under 
Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure. Further court came 
out with the view that it is well settled that where trial 
court has a discretion in the matter, the Appellate Court 
would not ordinarily, substitute its discretionary power 
exercise by the trial court. But it is equally well settled 
that where the trial court ignoring the evidence, side 
tracking the approach to be adopted, in the matter and over 
looking the various considerations, has exercised its 
discretion one way, the appellate court, keeping in view the 
fundamental principle can and ought to interfere because 
when it is said that a matter is within the discretion of 
the court, it is to be exercised according to well 
167 
established judicial principles, according to reason and 
fair plaiy and not according to whim and caprice. 
23 
"Discretion" said Lord Mansfield in R V/s V^ilkies , when 
applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided 
by law. It must be governed by rule not by humour; it must 
not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal & regular. 
In the course of this judgement we would be constrained to 
point out that both learned single judge and judges of the 
Division Bench completely overlooked the well established 
principles in granting standing stay of the suit in a case 
where reliance is placed upon a subsistence of arbitration 
agreement. 
Discretionary power of the court under Section 3A- of 
Arbitration Act. 19<4-0 in granting stay came under review in 
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. V/s General Electric Company , 
where the court directed that issue to be decided under 
Section 34 of the 1940 Act . In deciding the question under 
Section 34 of the Act, 1940, the court expressed its entire 
agreement with the view enunciated by Mr. Justice S.R. Das 
in Khushiram V. Huntumal that where on an application 
made under Section 34 of the Arbitrate Act, 1940, for stay 
of the suit, an issue is raised as to the formation, 
existence or validity of the contract containing the 
arbitration clause, the court is not bound to refuse a stay 
but may in its discretion, on the application for stay, 
decide as to the existence or validity of the arbitration 
IdS 
agreement even, though, it involved incidentally a decision 
as to the validity or existence of the parent contact. 
(B) MANDATORY POWER : Section 3 of the Arbitration (Protocol 
27 
and Convention) Act, 1937 dealt with the stay of legal 
proceedings when Protocol on Arbitration clauses applied 
to an agreement. 
The international Protocol and Arbitration clauses 
applied to an agreement on the fulfillment of the following 
condi tions. 
(1) When the parties were subject to the jurisdiction of 
different states between whom Protocol was in force, 
and 
(£) Uhen the parties were In agreement to submit to 
arbitration present or future disputes in connection 
with a contract relating to commercial matters, capable 
of settlement by arbitration. 
There was little difference between the provisions of 
29 Section 3 of the Act, 1937 and those of Section 3 of the 
30 
Act of 1961 dealing with the stay of local proceedings. 
To invoke the applicability of the Section 3, the following 
conditions were required to be satisfied; 
(i) there was to e an agreement between the citizens of 
different states; 
<ii) such agreement was required to be contained a clause 
agreeing to submit future dispute to arbitration. 
i^^ 
pursuance of an agreement to which Protocol applies. If the 
agreement to which Protocol applies is an agreement for 
arbitration, there can not possibly be, an agreement in 
pursuance of that agreement. Section 3 must, therefore, be 
construed as contemplating a case where not only is there an 
arbitration agreement in force between the parties, but 
36 
there has also been an actual reference to arbitration." 
This decision and these observation was based on the obiter 
opinion expressed by Clanson, J. M. Radio Publicity 
(Universal ) Ltd. V. Compaqnie Luxembouqeoise De 
37 Radiodifusion . The observation made in The Marak's case 
was noted by Grover J. in M/S V/0 Tractor Export. Mascow, 
38 V/s fi/S Tarapore and Co., Madras when the court was called 
upon to decide whether the word "a Submission made in 
pursuance of agreement" under Section 3 of the Foreign 
39 Awards (Recognition & Enforcement ) Act , 1961 mean an 
actual or completed reference made to pursuance an 
arbitration agreement or they mean an arbitration that has 
come into existence as a result of a commercial contract. 
It was argued by the Appellant firm that whenever there 
is an arbitration agreement or an Arbitral Clause in a 
commercial contract of the nature mentioned in the 
convention, the court is bound to stay the suit, if the 
other conditions prescribed by Section 3 are fulfilled. So 
the word "submission" was pleaded to be understood as an 
arbitration agreement or arbitral clause relating to 
liu 
existing or future difference and the word "agreement" means 
an agreement of a commercial or business character to which 
the Convention applies. 
On the other hand the respondent firm contented that 
the critical words "submission" and "agreement" must be 
given their natural and grammatical meaning and the word 
"submissions" made in pursuance of an agreement can only 
mean an actual submission of the dispute to the arbitral 
tribunal. The word "agreement" can have reference to and can 
be construed only in the sense of an arbitration agreement 
or an arbitral clause in a commercial contract. It can not 
mean a commercial contract because an arbitration agreement 
can not be stated to have been made pursuant to a commercial 
contract. 
In order to resolve the controversy on the said 
question the court after having examined legislative history 
of the enactment as well as its counterpart in England 
upheld the contention of the respondent and observed. 
"The language in the relevant article of the Convention 
of 1958 had also undergone a change. According to Article 
II, the term "agreement in writing" was to include an 
arbitral clause in a contract or arbitration agreement and 
that the term was stated to mean something by which the 
parties undertook to submit to arbitration all or any 
differences which arose between them in respect of any 
t i 
defined legal relationship whether contractual or not 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration. Thus, the term"agreement in writing embraced an 
arbitral Clause or an agreement to refer to arbitration as 
also an actual submission of the disputes to the arbitrator. 
It was equivalent to the "Arbitration Agreement" as defined 
in the Act. By not using that term and by employing the 
expression "submission" in Section 3, the Parliament appears 
to have indicated an intention to restrict the meaning of 
the expression to an actual submission or a complete 
reference. 
The approach in The Marek appeared to have been 
dominated in the said observation. Yet Grover. J. insisted 
to take the other view, as his Lordship thought that "if 
statutory enactments are clear in their meaning, they must 
be construed according to their meaning even though they are 
contrary to the comity of nations or international law. His 
Lordship went on in this strain: "if the term of 
legislative enactments do not suffer from any ambiguity or 
lack of clarity they must be given effect to, even, if they 
do not carry out the treaty obligation". The Learned Judge 
showed his awareness of the fact that the view propounded by 
him would hamper in carrying out the purpose and object 
behind the Protocol but such was the attachment of his 
Lordship to the mechanical jurisprudence that he felt 
compelled to take the view, which, to use the word of 
.U2 
A-l Scarman, J; made "nonsense of the Protocol" 
In Renusaqar Power Co. Ltd. V/s General Electric 
42 Company while determining the question as to whether under 
Section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and 
43 
Enforcement) Act, 1961 , having regard to its scope, a suit 
in the nature of a petition could be stayed? Supreme Court 
came out with the view that the Parliament by substituting 
through an amendment the phase "if any party to a submission 
made in pursuance of an agreement" with the phase "if any 
party to an agreement" under Section 3 of the Act, 1961, 
facilitated the stay of legal proceeding even before any 
actual reference was made. The court further observed, that 
on a plain reading of the section as it was then stand, two 
things became clear. First, the Section opened with a non-
obstante clause giving overriding effects to the provision 
contained therein and prevailed over anything to the 
contrary contained in Arbitration Act, 1940 or the Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908. Secondly, unlike Section 34 of 
Arbitration Act, which conferred a discretionary power upon 
the court, the Section 3 used the mandatory expression 
"shall" and made it obligatory upon the court to pass an 
order staying the legal proceedings, commenced by a party to 
the agreement, if the conditions specified therein are 
fulfilled. The conditions required to be fulfilled for 
invoking the Section 3 are as follows ; 
(i) There must be an agreement to which Article II of the 
1^6 
(iii)a submission had actually been made in pursuance of 
such agreement of an actual and existing dispute after 
it had arisen 
Once these conditions required under the said two Acts 
were fulfilled, the court was obliged to grant stay of 
proceeding, unless, satisfied that arbitration agreement had 
become inoperative or the arbitrator agreement could not be 
proceeded with. 
It may be recalled that in English law, there was a 
judicial difference of opinions as to whether an actual 
reference to arbitration was necessary or a mere agreement 
to arbitration, was enough. This difference of opinion was 
3E 
settled down in 1965 by the decision in The Marek's case 
which laid down that actual reference to arbitration was not 
necessary, an agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration 
33 
was enough. However, in 1959 the Calcutta High Court and 
in 1971 the Supreme Court took a different views. In Ul. 
35 Wood 8t Sons Ltd. V/s Bengal Corporation. Chakraverti J. 
observed : "it arbitration made between parties belonging to 
jurisdiction of different States that the Protocol 
recognises and what Section 3 of Act Contemplates, is 
obviously, an actual reference to arbitration made in 
pursuance of such an agreement. Whatever words may be 
substituted for the word "submission' in Section 3, it is 
impossible to escape the effect of the word made in 
Convention set forth in the schedule applies^ 
(ii) A party to that agreement is needed to commence legal 
proceedings against another party thereto. 
(iii)The legal proceedings must be "in respect of any matter 
agreed to be referred to arbitration" in such an 
agreement. 
(iv) The application for stay must made before filing the 
written statement or taking any other steps in legal 
proceed ings. 
<v) The court has to be satisfied that the agreement is 
valid, operative and capable of being performed. 
(vi) The court has to be satisfied that dispute is between 
the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be 
referred. 
(C) Distinction between the Acts of 19^0, 1937 and 1961 : As 
we have already pointed out that Section 3^ of Indian 
Arbitration Act of 1940 and Section 3 of the Protocol Act 
45 
of 1937 conferred the discretionary power on the courts 
for granting stay of judicial proceeding in dispute under 
commercial agreement which contained clauses for their 
settlement under foreign arbitral rules. This power of the 
court under the former Act was discretionary while it was 
mandatory under the latter enactment provided the court was 
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satisfied that the agreement or arbitration had not become 
inoperative or that the dispute was with regard to the 
matter agreed to be referred to arbitration. If these 
condition were fulfilled the court had to grant stay. It was 
thus, mandatory under the Act of 1937 and of 1961. Another 
remarkable difference between these two enactments was that 
under Section 3A- of Indian Arbitration Act the applicant 
had to prove that he was at the time when proceeding was 
commenced and still remained, ready and willing to do 
everything necessary for proper conduct of the arbitration, 
whereas there was no such condition under Section 3 of the 
Protocol Act 1937 . These differences were well expounded 
48 in W. Ulood & Sons. Ltd. V. Bengal Corporation . There was 
an agreement between W. Wood & sons and Bengal Corporation 
containing an arbitration clause for settlement of dispute 
according to English Arbitration laws. When dispute arose 
the appellant referred the matter to arbitration in England, 
but respondent did not Cooperate, consequently appellant had 
to file a suit in England and obtained a decree. Then 
respondent filed a suit in India and prayed for damages. In 
this suit the appellant made an application for stay of the 
49 
suit under Section 34 of Indian Arbitrate Act, 1940 and 
Section 3 of Protocol Act of 1937 . It was argued that 
although Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 required willingness 
and readiness, and Section 3 did not insist on this 
requirement and that was the effect of the words " 
itb 
lontained in the Indian Arbitration 
Act, 19^0" under Section 3 of 1937 Act. The said Contention 
was rejected and the court observed: 
The non-obstante expression in that section emphasised 
the main difference that while stay under Section 3^ of 
Indian Arbitration Act, 19^0 is always discretionary with 
the court by reason of the use of the word" may" therein, 
such stay is an obligation upon the curt under the Protocol 
Act, 1937 by reason of the use of the word "shall" in that 
Act, provided of course, certain conditions stated therein 
are present 
With regard to the prayer under Section 3 of 1937 Act, 
the court observed that the requirement of proof of 
applicant's readiness to resort to arbitration was not 
essential under it, and that the applicant should convince 
the court that "the agreement for arbitration has not 
become inoperative or can not be proceeded." 
Local actions, pending foreign arbitration proceedings, 
could also be stayed by the court on an application under 
Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, invoking the 
52 inherent power of the court. However, Calcutta High Court 
on different occasion pointed out that the conditions under 
which stay was grated in the Local actions under Section 151 
of Code of Civil Procedure, 1098 were entirely different 
from those wherein similar remedy was sanctioned under 
it/ 
Section 34 of the 19'!+0 Act. Whenever the court was called 
upon to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 151 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it examined the merit of the 
case to arrive at a conclusion on the issue whether a suit 
had been filed mala-fide and was in abuse of process of the 
court. Such a step was not relevant for granting of stay 
under Section 3A- of the Arbitration Act. Another 
distinction between these provision was that in an 
application for stay under Section 151 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1098, the onus rested on the party seeking the 
stay order, whereas the burden shifted to respondent under 
54 
Section 34 of the 1940, Act 
A significant conclusion one may safely derive from the 
above discussion that the parties to arbitration agreement 
in India under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards 
Act, 1961, were given free hand in invoking the jurisdiction 
of the Local court regarding the stay proceedings. There 
was no limit prescribed to discourage the courts from 
intervening into an on-going arbitration process. Thus, 
under the repealed laws, the proceedings in respect of 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards were unnecessary 
delayed for years altogether due to the stay orders issued 
by the courts under their inherent powers. 
The factor of time has assumed great significance in 
ito 
the era of internationalization of economic activitit;^ s,inuti 
the emergence of a new world order after the cold war was 
over. In the cost structure of business transactions, the 
element of time has occupied the top priority. Local 
economic trends and inflation play their own part in shaping 
the national strands of global interdependence. In the 
ethos of fluctuation and change, the entire world has moved 
in favour of a speedy resolution of commercial disputes. 
Maximum intervention by the courts in the arbitral 
process under the pretence of staying the Local action not 
only hampered the speedy settlement of commercial dispute 
through arbitration but also was a great hurdle to meet the 
growing intensity of international economic relations, which 
consequently, led to the foreign investors to form a biased 
opinion for conducting arbitration in India. This is the 
reason why the Multinational Companies, like Enron preferred 
arbitration in London according to English rule than to be 
bound by Indian law which is complicated, time consuming, 
cumbersome and litigation prone. 
In view of stepping of states into commercial 
activities coupled with the role of UNO in promoting barrier 
free trade regime, it is widely fell that the Indian System 
of Settlement of Commercial dispute has become outdated. It 
is also recognised that our on-going process of economic 
liberalisation may not become fully effective, if the law 
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dealing with settlement of international commercial dispute 
remains out of tune with such reforms. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996, seeks 
to bring the Indian system of settlement of commercial 
disputes akin to international norms in the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in India. 
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Chapter- V 
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ORDINANCE, 1966 -
AN EVALUATION 
On account of inherent legal loopholes and practical 
impediments in the existing arbitration laws, as we have 
analysed in the preceding pages, the necessity for a new 
arbitration law was voiced by various jurist for long. The 
statement of objects and reasons of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 itself reveals the legislative 
intention in bringing the said Ordinance . 
The Law Commission of India, on a reference made by the 
Government of India had made comprehensive suggestions for 
amendments in the existing enactments governing enforcement 
for foreign arbitral awards about 18 years ago, but 
unfortunately, the Law Ministry began the exercise of 
formulating this law only since 199E, in the wake of demands 
by a number of foreign investors who expressed their view 
that they would not wish to invest in India, unless dispute 
settlement arising out of their investments related matters 
B.TE: settled through arbitration abroad. The business 
community within the country also came out with the view 
that the system of settlement of commercial dispute be 
reformed in order to ensure the speedy settlement of the 
same. The pressure to amend existing arbitration laws and to 
brings them akin to international practice was intensified 
with the advent of economic liberalisation. The pressure. 
ID 
no doubt, had not been without reason - the Indian law on 
arbitration existing till the Ordinance came in was of 19^0 
vintage, and was described "bad in law" by many legal 
experts. 
Owing to several defects, the existing laws on 
arbitration do not facilitate the speedy settlement of 
commercial disputes. This is one of the reason why 
Multinational Corporation (liNC) like Enron preferred 
arbitration in London under international regulations than 
to be bound by Indian law. The matter which remained 
pending for long and was overdue for reform suddenly 
acquired a chance of being implemented on the face of the 
said scenario in national and international arena, which, 
consequently, compelled for reform in the existing laws of 
arbitration and therefore, the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Bill, 1995 as the first attempt to reform Indian arbitration 
Laws was brought in the Parliament but could not be passed 
in view of impasse in the Parliament following the telecom 
scandal. Thereafter, the Arbitration and Conciliation, 
Ordinance, 1996 was promulgated by the President on 16th 
January, 1996 and has been brought into force with effect 
from 25th January, 1996, nine days after its promulgation. 
The Ordinance like the Bill consolidates the existing 
laws of arbitration containing three enactments VIZ; the 
Arbitration Act, 19^0, the Arbitration (Protocol and 
iOj 
Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition 
and Enforcement) Act,1961 . However, since law has been 
brought through Ordinance, its life will be subjected to 
approval by the Parliament in the coming budget session by 
the present Government. 
At the outset several notable features of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance 1996, may be briefly 
mentioned, which in turn will facilitate the perusal of the 
provisions of the said Ordinance in respect of enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in India. 
The Ordinance seeks to consolidate and amend the law 
relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial 
arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and 
to provide for Conciliation as alternative means of 
settlement of commercial disputes. 
The Ordinance is based on the Model Law, approved by 
the United Nation General Assembly in 1986, which was 
prescribed by the UN Commission on International Trade law 
(UNCITRAL). With the adoption of Model Law, it is hoped 
that India would emerge as an important centre for 
settlement of international commercial disputes through 
arbitration. The advantage of these reforms is that they 
Bre the product of a consensus amongst countries which have 
both common law and civil law systems. The UNCITRAL Model 
Law has been taken into account by a number of industrially 
ibO 
advanced countries including, USA, Canada, Australia, Sweden 
and Netherland, while enacting their legislation on 
international Commercial arbitration. So there is an 
international consensus as to their application. The Model 
Law establishes a system for settlement of commercial 
dispute, through arbitration akin to international norms. 
Hence, it is designed to promote the uniformity between 
nations. There are definite advantages in giving effect to 
these rules in India, says Dr. P. C. Rao, the Union law 
secretary. In fact, there is no reason as to why these rules 
could not form the basis for domestic arbitration and 
Conciliation as well. He says that the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
arbitration represents an important improvement over Indian 
Arbitration Act, 19^0 in many aspects . 
Besides, the UNCITRAL Model Law also provides that 
grounds for challenging the awards be definite but limited; 
that the parties have to furnish Security to the Court to 
Cover the amount of awards before the challenge is 
entertained; that the provision for appeals from one forum 
to another forum be eliminated; that arbitral tribunal be 
empowered to award interest from the date on which the cause 
of action arises till the actual payment is made. 
The Ordinance accomplishes a dramatic reversal of the 
long standing bias of international Companies in favour of 
conducting arbitration outside India. This is because of the 
Ibi 
fact that arbitration conducted outside India are the 
subject matter of New York and Geneva Conventions on 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, to which India is a 
signatory. As Indian law on enforcement of foreign awards 
has long complied with international norms, the prevailing 
view has been that it is easier to arbitrate outside India, 
and get the arbitral award enforced in India than conducting 
an arbitration in India, pursuant to local law that is the 
Arbitration Act 1940. The view is belied by the said 
Ordinance . 
It is needless to mention that to provide an arbitral 
procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting 
the need of specific arbitration, and to minimize the 
supervisory role of the Courts in arbitral process, and to 
provide, that every final awards is enforced in the same 
manner as if it were a decree of the Court, the Ordinance 
provides a Model arbitration law free from obstacles in the 
way of enforcing the foreign arbitral awards, discussed in 
the preceding pages. 
The Ordinance not only defines the term "Foreign 
Award" for the purpose of its enforcement but also defines 
the power of judicial authority to refer the parties to 
arbitration in order to minimize the supervisory role of the 
Courts in arbitral process. Conditions for enforcement of a 
foreign award in India, Coupled with grounds of its refusal 
it) , 
and evidence to be advanced for enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards have been re-enacted in the Ordinance. The 
provision of appeal has also been incorporated in the 
Ordinance, wherein an appeal shall lie from the order 
refusing, to refer the parties to arbitration and to enforce 
a foreign award, to the Court authorised by law to hear such 
appeal from such order. 
Each aspect of the Ordinance will now be discussed at 
length in turn. 
The most important departure made by the Ordinance is 
in regard to judicial intervention with the process and 
product of arbitration. If there is an agreement to 
arbitrate disputes in India, the Ordinance mandates a Court 
to refer the parties to arbitration, provided that a party 
applies for such reference before submitting his first 
statement on substance of the dispute. This is a radical 
departure from the 19^0 Act which under Section 3^ conferred 
the Court discretionary power to stay the legal proceedings 
and refer the parties to arbitration if the Court was 
satisfied that there was no sufficient reason why the matter 
should not be referred to in accordance with arbitration 
agreement and the applicant was and remains ready and 
willing to do all the things necessary to the proper conduct 
of the arbitration. 
The controversy with regard to the question as to 
itiA 
whether the written statement was qua procedural or 
substantive issue, and whether, for example, seeking time 
for filing a written statement constitutes "taking any other 
step" has been eliminated by the language in the Ordinance, 
requiring a party to apply for reference to arbitration 
before submitting his written statement on the substance of 
dispute. 
The Ordinance, like existing laws, conforms to the New 
York and Geneva Conventions and mandates the Courts, where 
there is an agreement to arbitrate disputes outside India, 
to refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed. 
Here, the mandatory language is deceptive. Far from 
being a mandatory duty to refer parties to arbitration, in 
fact, the court is accorded a discretionary power. 
In sharp contrast, where an arbitration takes place in 
India, the Ordinance provides that the arbitral tribunal, 
not the Court, shall determine the existence or validity of 
the arbitration agreement. Thus, at the threshold stage, the 
court has much greater scope for exercising the jurisdiction 
in a matter subject to an agreement to arbitrate disputes 
outside India than an agreement to arbitrate in India. 
The Ordinance is a first step towards bringing 
ibt 
contractual disputes back within the purview of the law. It 
consequently, destroys the grounds for taking international 
commercial disputes to the court abroad as in the recent 
past, settlement of commercial disputes abroad has been a 
pre-condition in many foreign investments agreement. Under 
the existing laws, arbitration proceedings, are delayed for 
years due to stay order issued by the courts under their 
general inherent power. The Ordinance redresses the legal 
loopholes by diluting the power of the courts. The new law 
provides for moving the court, challenge the validity of the 
awards only on selected grounds. 
Incidentally this clause, it is hopped, will be 
construed widely so as to cover commission and forum 
entrusted with adjudication of of consumer disputes also 
The ground on which award of an arbitrator may be 
challenged before the court have been severely cut down so 
that, broadly spleaking, such a challenge will be permitted 
only on the basis of invalidity of the agreement, want of 
jurisdiction on the part of arbitrator or want of proper 
notice to a party of the appointment of the arbitrator or of 
arbitral proceedings or party being unable to present its 
case. At the same time, an award can also be set aside if it 
is in conflict with "the public policy" of India a ground 
which covers, inter alia, fraud and corruption. 
Under the old laws, the courts could be invoked at any 
Ibj 
stage of arbitration. There was a problem of indirect 
enforcement, court played a maximum role in arbitral process 
in making the arbitral award a "rule of court" before it was 
enforced. The involvement of the court has been minimized in 
the process of arbitration as the Ordinance provides that 
every final arbitral award is enforceable in the same manner 
as if it were a decree of the court. The Ordinance dispensed 
with the said system of making the award, a "rule of court" 
before it was enforced. The award is now made executable as 
a decree and it will no longer be necessary to apply for 
conformation of the award. Therefore, the new Ordinance 
would restrict unnecessary interference by the court in 
arbitration proceedings which consequently, avoid the delay 
which had been one of the bad features of the repealed 
enactments. The importance of transnational commercial 
arbitration has been recognised and it has been 
specifically provided that even when the arbitration is held 
in India, the parties to the substantive contract would be 
free to designate the law applicable to the substance of 
dispute. 
Under the repealed laws, an arbitrator was not required 
to give reason to his award. This increased the power of 
discretion in the hand of arbitrator. But under the new 
provision arbitrator has to give reason for his award : This 
need not be so if the litigants decide otherwise. 
It is expected that these innovations, modifications 
Ibo 
and additions will go a long way towards having on the 
Indian statute book, an arbitration law which is rational in 
its organisation, streamlined in its design, modern in its 
approach or faithful to the need of a country, which is 
making serious and heroic efforts to place itself on the 
global map as a leading commercial nation equipped to 
transact business and to facilitate dispute resolution in 
most scientific manner . 
(A) ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS IN INDIA 
After having gone through the remarkable features of 
the new law, it is desirable to discuss the conditions for 
enforcement coupled with the grounds on which a foreign 
award can be refused under the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ordinance, 1996. 
In the following paragraphs, an attempt has been made 
to present an analytical study of the new law in respect of 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award in India. 
In India foreign award could be enforced under the 
multilateral Conventions namely, the Geneva Convention of 
19E7 and the New York Convention, 195B, if the said 
Convention applied to the arbitration agreements. India was 
a party to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 
19E3, the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Award, 1927 and the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
lb? 
1958. It became a party to the 1958 Convention on 10th 
June, 1958 and had ratified it on 13the July, 1960. India 
had enacted legislations to give effect to the Protocol and 
two Conventions. The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) 
Act, 1937, which came into force on 4th March, 1937, gave 
effect to the Protocol of 1923 and the subsequent Convention 
of 19E7. It provided for enforcement of arbitral agreements 
to which the Protocol applied and the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards to which the Convention of 1927 applied. The 
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 which 
came into force on 30th November, 1961 had been enacted 
pursuant to the New York Convention of 1958 and it 
prescribed the law and the procedure for the enforcement of 
foreign awards in India to which the said Convention 
applied. The Geneva Convention ceased to be applied to those 
awards to which the New York Convention applied. 
India had ratified the said Conventions Subject to two 
reservation. Firstly, that it would apply the Conventions 
to recognition and enforcement of an award only if it was 
made in the territory of another contracting state. The 
second reservation was that India would apply the 
Conventions only to differences arising out of legal 
relationship, which are considered commercial' under the law 
in force in India. 
Though the Act of 1937 and of 1961 which were based on 
IbS 
the Geneva and New York Conventions respectively, have been 
repealed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 
1961, but the Scheme of the said two Conventions in respect 
of enforcement of foreign awards in India, have in essence 
been maintained under the new Ordinance, 1996 with little 
bit modification, to make it in tune with international 
standard. However, it is significant to note that an 
arbitral proceedings that began before the Ordinance, 1996, 
came into force, will continue to be governed by the 
repealed enactments. Since the present Scheme of enforcing 
foreign award under the said two Conventions are maintained 
in the new law, it is therefore, proposed to discuss the 
topic under following Sub-headings. 
(B) ENFORCEMENT OF GENEVA CONVENT ICWM AWARDS : Here the 
'Geneva Convention Award' means an arbitral award on 
differences relating to matters considered as 'commercial' 
under the law in force in India, made after the ESth day of 
July, 1927 and must have been made in a country which has 
ratified the Geneva Convention of 19S7 . The mode for 
enforcement of the Geneva Convention award has been provided 
7 
under Section 58 of the Chapter II of the Ordinance . First, 
of all, the court has to be satisfied as to whether the the 
foreign award is enforceable under the said Chapter or not. 
It also has to examine whether the foreign award fulfils 
the condition laid down in Chapter II for its enforcement. 
In sharp contrast to the repealed laws, when a foreign 
it)9 
award fulfils those conditions mentioned under the Chapter 
II of the Ordinance, the same automatically becomes 
enforceable and the award shall be deemed to be a decree of 
the court. Thus, under the New Ordinance a foreign award 
has been made directly enforceable as a decree of the court. 
There is no need to approach the enforcing court for its 
conversion into a 'rule of court' in order to make it 
enforceable. Thus, new law has dispensed with the old system 
of making the arbitral award a 'rule of court' before it is 
enforced. The foreign arbitral awards once becomes final, 
will be enforced as it were a decree of court. Section 57 of 
the Ordinance deals with the conditions for enforcement of a 
foreign award coupled with the defences available to the 
8 party against whom the award is invoked . In conformity with 
the repealed laws, the onus probandi is still on the 
shoulder of the party seeking enforcement of the Geneva 
Convention award. The party applying for the enforcement of 
a foreign award is required at the time of filing the 
application to produce : (i) the original award or copy 
thereof duly authenticated, (ii) evidence proving that the 
award has become final and (iii) Such evidence as may be 
necessary to prove that the conditions mentioned in clauses 
9 (a) and (e) of sub section (i) of section 57 are satisfied . 
The Ordinance like earlier enactments imposes on the 
party seeking enforcement of foreign award a burden of 
proving the finality of the award. The party is also 
1/0 
required to prove that any proceeding for the purpose of 
contesting the validity of the award are not pending. In 
practice, the validity and finality of an award can be 
proved only by producing an exequatur (Leave for enforcement 
or like) issued by the court of the country in which the 
award is made. This requirement is in ultimate analysis, 
amounts to a cumbersome and time consuming system of double 
exequatur as the party has also to acquire a leave for 
enforcement in the country in which he seeks enforcement. 
Thus, the Ordinance of 1996 failed to dispense with, 
one of the chronic existing problem of double exequatur, 
inherited from Geneva Convention in the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in India. It not only poses a great 
hindrance in enforcing a foreign award in India but also 
frustrates the purpose of arbitration, which has been one of 
the prime cause in bringing the Ordinance to make the 
arbitration law in India more responsive to the 
contemporary requirement of international trade relations. 
(1) CONDITION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF GENEVA CONVENTION AWARDS : 
Section 57 of the Ordinance, 1996 , which deals with the 
conditions for enforcement of Geneva Convention Award as 
well as defences available to the party against whom its 
enforcement is sought, required the party seeking 
enforcement of a foreign award to prove the following 
condi tions. 
i V i 
Firstly, the award has been made in pursuance of a 
submission to arbitration,which is valid under the law 
applicable thereto. Since the phrase "in pursuance of an 
agreement for arbitration " has been replaced by the phrase 
"in pursuance of a submission to arbitration", now an 
arbitration agreement concluded between the parties is not 
enough but there must also has been an 'actual submission' 
of disputes to arbitration. The 'submission to arbitration' 
may be construed as an actual submission of an existing 
dispute to a particular arbitrator. It exclude the awards 
from the purview of Section 57 (a) when a submission to 
arbitration is not valid in one country but valid under the 
law of another country. Yet again, the Ordinance like the 
old law gives no idea, about the law which is to govern the 
validity of a submission to arbitration as it may be made in 
one country and sought to be enforced in another country. 
It again left the controversy to be decided by the Court in 
view of the intention of the parties, express or implied in 
the Submission for arbitration. It also, at the same time 
allowed the party against whom the award has been made to 
contest the validity of the award on the grounds other than 
those mentioned in Section 57(l)(a)(c) and Section 57 
(2)(b)(c) whereby the court is empowered to refuse the 
1E 
enforcement or adjourn the consideration thereof , giving 
such party a reasonable time within which he can get the 
award annulled by a competent court. 
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Secondly, the condition which is required to be 
fulfilled is that the subject matter of the award is 
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arbitrable under the law of India . There is a praiseworthy 
addition in the Ordinance, with reference to the Geneva 
Convention award that it has not only been made in 
conformity with the arbitration procedure in India but the 
subject matters too must have been capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of India. Under the repealed law, 
the phrase 'arbitration procedure' was a matter of 
controversy. At one time it was not clear that whether 
arbitrators should follow the procedure laid down by 
arbitration enactment in the country in which the 
arbitration was held or whether he should also follow the 
principles of natural justice and equity. Now the Ordinance 
has settled down the first half of the controversy that the 
phrase 'arbitration procedure' should be construed as 
procedure prescribed under the law of arbitration in India. 
Though, the second half of the controversy remains 
unanswered. A new obstacle may also come in the way of 
enforcement of foreign awards in India that what kind of 
disputes are capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of India? This is the question which may arise both at 
the beginning of arbitration (is this dispute capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of India) and at the 
end (was this dispute capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of India?). The question of "arbitrabi1ity" 
1/3 
invDrvG&, of course , a question of public policy; and =ince 
public policy may change fromtime to time this is an 
unpredictable area of law. This is one of the grounds which 
may be raised by relevant court on its own motion. 
Thirdly, the award has been made by arbitral tribunal, 
provided for in the submission to arbitration or constituted 
in the manner agreed upon by the parties and in the 
conformity with the law governing the arbitration 
1^ procedure . This also furnishes a ground in the hand of the 
party against whom the award has been made, to contest the 
"validity' of the award. To succeed on this ground it must 
be shown that the composition of arbitral tribunal was not 
in accordance with the law governing the arbitration 
proceedings. In this way the condition under review, grants 
absolute freedom to the parties to select arbitrator of 
their choice. It is worthless to mention, that the essence 
of arbitration being a decision by an agreed arbitral 
tribunal, an awards made otherwise than by that process can 
not be enforced. 
Fourthly, the award has become final in the country in 
which it has been made, in the sense that it will not be 
considered as such if it is open to opposition or appeal or 
it is proved that any proceedings for the purpose of 
contesting the validity of the award are pending . The 
purpose of arbitration is to achieve a binding 
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determination of disputes. However, an award may be made 
which is said to be final and binding upon the parties. But 
it proves not to be so if it is subject to a successful 
challenge which renders it unenforceable e.g. if it is open 
to opposition or appeal or it is proved to be unenforceable 
on the ground of being contested its 'validity'. So an 
award cannot be enforced in India, if some further legal 
proceedings have been initiated to examine the validity of 
the award. This clause of Section 57 the Ordinance has made 
the ground of finality more specific by providing instances 
where an award cannot be treated final. An award can only be 
treated final if it confirms the conditions prescribed for 
its enforcement and become a decree of the court. 
Fifthly, the enforcement of the award is not contrary 
to the "public policy" or the 'law of India'. An explanation 
has also been attached together with this provision, under 
which if the making of the awards was induced or affected by 
fraud or corruption, that award would be said to be in 
conflict with "public policy" of India . The concept of 
public policy' has been the most ambiguous area since the 
beginning of the arbitration laws in India. The Ordinance 
like earlier enactments no where defined the term 'public 
policy'. It has been construed in different prospects by the 
various courts of the country. Sometime it said to be 
'unruly horse' and more often it termed as 'untrustworthy* 
guide. It allows the enforcing curt unfettered freedom to 
l / . 
frianoeuvre them in the narrow constraints of domestic law and 
made it unpredictable area of the law of arbitration. 
Besides, a commendable attempts have been made to make it 
more specific through an explanation attached with clause 
(e) of Section 57 that an award would be considered in 
conflict with 'public policy' of India'; if it was induced 
or affected by fraud or corruption. 
(E) DEFENCES AVAILABLE TO THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE AUARD 
IS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED : The defences available to the 
party against whom the award is sought to be enforced are 
provided under Section 57 clause (S) of the Ordinance, 
wherein the said party is allowed to challenge the award 
even if the conditions laid down in Section 57 (1) are 
17 fulfilled . An award can be refused if the court is 
satisfied that; 
(a) The award has been annulled in the country in which it 
was made 
(b) The party against whom it is sought to use the award 
was not given notice of the arbitration proceedings 
in sufficient time to enable him to present his case; 
or that, being under a legal incapacity, he was not 
properly represented ; 
(c) The award does not deal with differences 
contemplated by or falling within the terms of 
IVo 
submission to arbitration or that it contains decision 
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. 
The first two grounds of refusal for enforcement of 
foreign award are almost similar to those which were 
available in the Act of 1937 and hence, need not be 
discussed again . The third ground of refusal has in essence 
been taken from Article (V)(I)(C) of the New York 
Convention. To succeed on this ground it must be shown that 
"the award deals with differences not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration or 
it contains decision on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration; provided that if the award has 
not covered all difference submitted to arbitral tribunal, 
the court may , if it thinks fit, postpone such enforcement 
or grant it subject to such guarantee as the court may 
decide 
Thus, the said ground of refusal of an award has a 
broader ambit, not only to include the differences 
contemplated within the term of the submission to 
arbitration but also the differences falling otherwise 
within the term of the submission to arbitration which in 
consequence, makes the grounds of challenging the awards 
illustrative instead of exhaustive. 
(C) ENFORCEMENT OF NEW YORK CONVENTION AWARDS : The 
provisions for enforcement of New York Convention awards 
iV7 
have been provided in Chapter I of the Ordinance. As we know 
that India had ratified the New York Convention 1958 and 
gave effect to it by enacting the Foreign Awards 
(Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. Though, the said 
Act has been repealed through the Ordinance of 1996, but the 
applicability of the schemes of New York Convention of 
1958, is still, intact with reference to the award made out 
of the countries members to the said Convention. 
Here the New York Convention's awards means an arbitral 
award on differences between person arising out of legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, considered as 
commercial under the law in force in India, made on, or 
after the 11th day of October, 1960 in pursuance of an 
agreement for arbitration to which the New York Convention 
spplles 
India had ratified the New York Convention subject 
'Commercial' reservation. By virtue of this reservation made 
by India, the provisions of the Ordinance in respect to New 
York Convention awards like the two repealed enactments, 
apply to the awards with reference to the matters which are 
considered as "Commercial" under the law in India. The term 
"Commercial" has again not been defined in the Ordinance. 
The provision regarding to the binding force of an award has 
also in essence, been taken back from the Act of 1961 and 
20 incorporated under section 46 of the Ordinance . The 
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involvement of the courts in arbitral proceedings in respect 
of enforcement of foreign awards have already been discussed 
in the proceeding pages. Here we are concerned with the 
conditions required to be proved for enforcement of an 
arbitral award arising out of the countries signatories to 
the New York Convention, coupled with the grounds on which 
its enforcement can be denied. 
Under the Ordinance, once the formalities required for 
El 
enforcement of a foreign award under section 47 and the 
conditions required to be satisfied under Section 48 are 
fulfilled, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of the 
court and automatically, becomes enforceable. 
However, the provision for an appeal has also been 
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incorporated in the Ordinance under Section 50 , wherein an 
appeal shell lie from the order refusing to, <a) refer the 
parties to arbitration and, (b) to enforce a foreign award. 
The appeal to be made to the court authorised by the law to 
hear such appeal from such order. No second appeal shall 
lie from an order passed in appeal under the said Section of 
the Ordinance except an appeal to the Supreme Court of 
India. In this way a deviation has been made from New York 
Convention, which did not provide any review on merits of an 
award to which the Convention applied. 
The provision in respect of enforcement of the New York 
Convention awards in the Ordinance have in essence, been 
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taken from the Model Law , which provides a model 
arbitration free from unnecessary and complicated national 
procedural laws. The Ordinance, while adopting the Model Law 
reveals an important improvement over the earlier repealed 
enactments by enshrining a word "only" under Section ^8(1), 
which has restricted and specified the grounds of refusal of 
an award and allows an active attack on it only on the 
25 
grounds listed in the said Section 
(1) CONDITIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF NEW YORK CONVENTION AWARDS: 
Once a foreign award is filed in a competent court and the 
court is satisfied that the award is enforceable under 
relevant provision of the Ordinance, the award shall be 
deemed to be a decree of the court unless it is covered by 
one of the provisions of Section ^8 which is pari materia 
with the Act of 1961. 
If a foreign award is enforceable under the relevant 
provision of the Ordinance, even then it may be dismissed 
only on one of the following grounds. 
(a) Lack of capacity of the parties to conclude an 
arbitration agreement or lack of valid arbitration 
agreement. 
(b) When the aggrieved party was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitral 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his 
case. 
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(c) Where the award deals with the matters not contemplated 
or not falling within the term of submission to 
arbitration and, thereby rendering the arbitral 
tribunal incompetent on account of lack of 
jur isd iction. 
(d) Where the composition of of arbitral tribunal or the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties or not in accordance with the 
law of the country where the arbitration took place. 
(e) Where the award has not yet become binding on the 
parties or has been set aside or suspended by the 
competent authority of the country where the award was 
made. 
(f) The subject matter of dispute is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of India. 
(g) That enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of India. 
For refusal of enforcement of a foreign award, these 
grounds have to be proved by the party resisting the 
enforcement. Therefore, these ground may be viewed as a 
defartcB available to the defendant in an enforcement of a 
foreign award proceedings. 
The Ordinance makes it clear that an application for 
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setting aside en award is intended to be the sole 
opportunity for recourse against it in the state where the 
arbitration took place. The intention is to exclude any 
other form of recourse that might be available under the 
laws of the states relating to matters other than 
arbitration. The purpose of this limitation is to ensure 
that foreigners contemplating arbitration in a state, which 
has adopted the Model Law are fully aware of the means by 
which an award may be refused . The said intention brings 
the Ordinance compatible with the norms of international 
commercial arbitration. 
The travaux preparatoires make it clear that the 
provision of public policy is intended to cover the 
possibility of refusing an award, if the arbitral tribunal 
has been corrupted by some way, or if it has been misled by 
corrupt evidences. This was considered necessary because 
doubt were raised as to whether the requirement of equality 
of treatment and of giving the parties a full opportunity to 
present their respective cases adequately covered all the 
circumstances in which award might be refused 
28 Section ^8(3) creates an opportunity for the ward to 
be rescued from total nullity, where the defect complained 
of, is capable of being remedied. The court may if, it 
thinks proper, adjourn the decision on enforcement of award 
and may oblige the winning party by ordering the other party 
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to give suitable security. 
Adequate safeguards have been provided for defendants 
29 
under section ^8 of the Ordinance . Generally, the court in 
order to satisfy itself that whether the award is 
enforceable or not, tests the award on the same grounds 
which are prescribed for refusal of an award which, however, 
causes difficulties in effect. The first, is that the 
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challenge, on initiative of losing party, under Section ^8 
will, if successful, nullify the award altogether and 
renders it incapable for enforcement both in the state where 
the arbitration took place and where the award is 
challenged. Another difficulty is that the public policy 
requirement of the state in which the arbitration is held 
may be different from the state in which the enforcement is 
sought. 
In sum, the new law has greatly reduced the 
intervention of the court in arbitral process. The New York 
Convention Awards and the Geneva Convention Awards are 
directly enforceable as a decree of the court. The need for 
going to the court for its conversion into a 'rule of court' 
has been abolished-
The Ordinance seeks to reverse the traditional bias 
against conducting arbitration in India by going further to 
the New York Convention and Geneva Convention in limiting 
the scope for Judicial intervention in the arbitral process 
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and therefore, preventing the party from thwarting the 
enforcement proceeding by seeking stay in contravention with 
the arbitration agreement. 
Besides, the grounds for challenging the awards have 
been made more specific. The New law restricts the scope of 
Judicial Scrutiny of the award and clearly defines the 
grounds on which an application for setting aside an award 
can be entertained by the court. Though, the grounds of 
challenging the award have, in essence, been taken from the 
Act of 1961, but the ambiguity of residuary ground which 
empowers the court to go into the merits of the award if it 
is in conflict with the "public policy' of India has to a 
greater extent been reduced by an explanation attached to 
the Section ^8(2)"^^ . 
At the same time the new law again failed to resolve 
the problem of arbitrabi1ity of dispute under the law of 
India. No guide line has been provided under the new law for 
its determination. The discretion granted to the court to 
determine whether the subject matter of dispute is capable 
of settlement through arbitration under the law of India is 
indirectly allows the court to step into an on-going 
arbitral process. 
The controversy over the word 'commercial' as a 
constituent of the term 'foreign award' remained untouched 
under the New law. 
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court, or any court of small causes. 
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were, under the law applicable to them, under some 
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decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
enforced; or 
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was not in accordance with the law of the country where 
the arbitration took place; or 
e- the award has not yet become binding on the parties or 
has been set aside or suspended by a competent 
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Chapter - VI 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
It would be seen from the foregoing analysis that the 
enactment hitherto governing the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in India viz; the Arbitration (Protocol and 
Convention) Act, 1937 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition 
and Enforcement) Act, 1961, were fraught with several 
loopholes and practical impediments. 
Prior to 1937, the Indian Court used to take recourse 
to such a statute which even did not contain any provision 
in respect of enforcement of foreign awards in India. The 
courts devised short term remedies by way of interpretation 
of the then existing statute namely the Indian Arbitration 
Act, 1889, whenever they were approached to decide cases 
concerning enforcement of foreign awards in India. The use 
of such a statutes^ which was no way concerned with the 
problems dealt with, consequently brought discretion in the 
hand of the courts to decide the cases of the said nature, 
by extracting the authority by way of interpretation of the 
Indian Arbitration Act, 1889. The parties to foreign 
agreements taking advantage of the said discretion of the 
courts could have easily taken the stay of legal proceeding'' 
concerning enforcement of foreign awards, even in the cases 
where under the term of contract parties had agreed upon to 
refer all their disputes to the court of a particular 
country. Lack of any specific provision with regard to 
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enforcement of foreign award in India and discretion 
exercised by the courts in granting stay of the proceeding 
regarding enforcement of foreign awards, hampered the speedy 
settlement of international commercial disputes and 
enforcement of its resultant awards in India. 
To meet the widely expressed desire of the commercial 
world that India should ensured effective recognition and 
protection of foreign arbitration agreement, so that 
international mercantile community could establish trade 
relations with India. Accordingly, India had signed the 
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration clauses, 1923 and the Geneva 
Convention on Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1927 and 
gave effect to it by enacting Arbitrat^ O^r) (Protocol and 
Convention) Act, 1937. 
It was, however, felt that Geneva Convention hampered 
the speedy resolution of disputes through arbitration and 
hence, no longer met the requirements of international 
trade. Therefore, a draft Convention was prepared by the 
International Chambers of Commerce, which was considered by 
the United Nation Economic and Social Council in 
consultation with the Government of various countries and 
finally, a new International Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was adopted at New 
York on 10th June, 1958. India also became a party to the 
New York Convention and gave effect to it by enacting the 
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Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1996. 
Doth the 1937 and 1961 Acts were simultaneously 
operative. The Act of 1937 was applicable for recognition 
and enforcement offaj awards arising out of arbitration held 
between those states who were not the parties to the New 
York Convention but were signatory to the Geneva Convention, 
1927 and the the Geneva Protocol 1933. However, the Act of 
1961 was applicable to all those states who had ratified the 
New York Convention 1958 and was not signatory to the Geneva 
Convention 1957. 
The object of the said two enactment was to enjoin the 
parties to arbitration agreement to abide by their 
undertaking relating to arbitration. But on account of 
several legal Lacunae and practical impediment, the said two 
enactments surveyed in the preceding chapters, failed to 
achieve its proclaimed objectives. 
One of the teething problems that emerged under both 
the enactments, was related to its applicability. India had 
ratified the Geneva and New York Conventions subject to 
"commercial reservation' and the same was ifche 1 incorporated 
under the Act of 1937 as well as of 1961. Both the Acts 
were accordingly made applicable only to a foreign award 
arising out of matters, which, by the law in force in India, 
were considered 'commercial'. At the same time there 
existed no explanation to the term 'commercial' under the 
l i i J 
said enactments which consequently, led to a great 
difficulty to comprehend the exact content of the term 
'foreign award' as a sole ground to make the Act of 1937 and 
of 1961 applicable in respect of enforcement of foreign 
awards in India. 
Disputes involving technical assistance and know-how 
were outside the purview of these statutes as they were 
considered 'professional' and not of 'commercial' charactBv 
by the courts in India, which with due respect seems odd 
with liberal bent to give widest possible meaning to the 
term 'commercial'. 
Unfortunately, the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ordinance, 1996 has also bypassed the said controversy and 
failed to provide any guide line in determining the 
'commercial' character of disputes for its applicability. 
It is submitted that the real question is, as to how 
term 'commercial' is understood in the modern word. Post^ 
A/ / 
second womld war^ i era has developed a complex network of 
' "~~- P 
economic relationship between the member of world growing 
family. The Charter of United Nation's pronounced 
emphasis on economic dimension of international life, and 
global inter-dependence as an acknowledged feature of 
the new philosophy, opened a new channel to industry and 
trade. Development of modern science and technology have 
also brought the international mercantile community closer 
to their economic relations. 
In view of the said scenario the term 'commercial' 
which is an expression of wide import and embraces every 
communication, business activities and intercourse includirg 
transportation purchase, sale, exchange of commodities and 
supply of information and technical assistance between the 
subjects of two states, should be given the widest possible 
meaning. 
Growing intensity of modern international trade and 
resort to arbitration as a forum of settlement of 
international commercial disputes have exposed several in-
built weaknesses and consequential practical impediments of 
the Act of 1937 and of 1961 in respect of enforcement o-' 
foreign arbitral awards in India. 
The Act of 1937 placed on the party seeking enforcement 
of a foreign award, heavy burden of proving the conditions! 
necessary for such enforcement. One of the complex 
conditions was that he had to produce documentary evidence-
showing the finality of the award in the country of its 
origin as well as in the country where its enforcement was 
sought. In practice, this requirement in its ultimate 
analysis amounted the problem of doubt exequatur in respect 
of enforcement of Geneva Convention awards. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance 1996, failed 
1 y ; 
to Dvercome the above referred problem of doubt exequatur, 
Instead of eliminating the said problem, the Ordinance ha«; 
made inroad on strengthening the system of doubt exequatur 
by providing an explanation that a foreign award resulted 
from the counties signatory to the Geneva Convention will 
not be considered final, if it is open to opposition or 
appeal or if it is proved that any proceeding for the 
purpose of contesting the validity are pending. 
The party seeking enforcement of a foreign award under 
the Act of 1937 was required to prove the validity of 
arbitration agreements, both in the country of its origin 
and where its enforcement was sought. There existed nc 
indication as to the law determining the validity of these 
agreements, as it was made in are country and sought to be 
enforced in another country. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 like 
the old law gives no idea about the law to govern the 
validity of a submission to arbitration. It left 
controversy to be decided by the country where its 
enforcement is sought in view of the intention of the party, 
express or implied in submission to arbitration. Such an 
ignorance of the said problems will ultimately invite 
litigations to contest the validity of the award by the 
adverse party. 
The Act of 1961 provided wholly revised scheme of 
1^. 
conditions required for enforcement of a foreign award in 
India. It not only shifted the heavy burden of proving the 
said conditions on the shoulder of contesting party, but 
also minimised the power of the scrutiny of the courts 
available to them under the Act of 1937. Nevertheless, the 
Act of 1961 was also plagued with certain practical 
impediments in respect of enforcement of a foreign award in 
India. 
Refusal for enforcement of a foreign award under ths 
Act of 1961 on the grounds that it has not become binding on 
the parties led to a great confusion owing to the absence of 
any guideline for determining its character and the moment 
are which it would become binding. 
Yet again the Ordinance, 1996 left the controversy to 
be decided by the Court's prudence. 
Under the Act of 1937 as well as 1961 the role of the 
courts in the arbitral process and product was on it!» 
height. The foreign award could not be enforced directly, 
unless the enforcing court made it a 'rule of court'. Such 
a conversion a foreign award in its ultimate analysis 
delayed the enforcement proceedings for years and 
consequently, frustrated the very purpose of arbitration. 
The Ordinance of 1996, commendably dispensed with the; 
old system of conversion of a foreign award into a 'rule of 
liid 
court'. Now a foreign award would be directly enforceable 
as if it were a decree of the court. 
The Ordinance has made dramatic reversal of a lont) 
standing bias of international companies against conductinq 
arbitration in India. This is because the arbitration 
conducted outside India are the subject matter of the New 
York and Geneva Conventions on Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards to which India is a signatory. As Indian 
law on enforcement of foreign award has long complied wit|-
international norms, the prevailing view has been that it is 
easier to arbitrate outside India and get the arbitral award 
enforced in India. That view is belied by the Ordinance 199£. 
There were two residuary grounds under both the Act of 
1937 and of 1961 which empowered the court to refuse the 
enforcement of a foreign award if it was contrary to "public 
policy' and principle of law of India. These grounds agair 
had not only enhanced the judicial scrutiny of the award but 
also caused unneccessary delay in the enforcement of a 
foreign awards in India. Refusal of an award on ground of 
violation of "public policy' of the the state in which the 
arbitration is held may be different from the state, where 
its enforcement is sought. This condition in fact provided 
an opportunity to the reluctant party to attack on an award 
that it was against the public public of India. 
The Arbitration Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 has made a 
COQ 
praiseworthy improvement with regard to the said grounds oi' 
refusal of awards under the repealed enactments. The grounds; 
of public policy has been made more specific by an 
explanation attached with the relevant provision, wherein, 
if the making of the ward was induced are affected by frauc 
a corruption, that award would be considered to be ir 
conflict with the public policy of India. 
The parties to foreign arbitration agreement in India 
under the repealed enactments were given free hand in 
invoking the jurisdiction of the local courts regarding the 
stay proceedings. Thus, under the Act of 1937 and of 1961, 
the proceedings concerning enforcement of a foreign award 
were unnecessary delayed for years altogether due to stay 
order issued by the courts by virtue of their inherent 
powers even in an very general circumstances. There was no 
limit prescribed to discourage the courts from intervening 
into an on-going arbitration process. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 has 
been successful in making the arbitral process easier and 
speedy. It mandates the courts to rsfer the parties to the 
decision of arbitrators unless it finds that the arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed provided, that the party applies for such 
reference. A foreign award shall be treated as binding for 
all purposes on the person as between whom it was made, and 
Zii 
may accordingly be relied on by person applied for SUCT 
reference by way of defence, set off or otherwise in an/ 
legal proceeding in respect of enforcement of foreign award 
in India. 
As could be seen from the perusal of the Ordinance, tho 
whole emphasis of new law is to make arbitration process 
more expeditious and simple. The factor of time has assumeci 
great significance in the era of international isat ion o-^  
economics activities since the emergence of a new world 
order in the post world ward era. In the cost structure O" 
international business transaction the element of time has; 
occupied the top most agenda of all the things cared of, 
The local economic trends and inflation play their own part 
in shaping the national strands of global inter-dependence. 
In the ethos of fluctuation and change, the entire world has. 
moved in favour of speedy settlement of internationa] 
commercial disputes. 
The trend of developing free trade blocks like SAFTA, 
NAFTA, EEC and SAARC etc. and the emergence of llbrld Trade 
Organisation (UTO) coupled with India's expanded external 
commerce horizon by virtue of economic liberalisation, it is 
expected that the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance 
1996 which embodies the mature version of modern nations, 
will go a long way to materialise the India's heroic efforts 
to place itself on the global map as a leading commercial 
nation. 
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